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If develop;ng countries follow the same paths  years of high rep  ,ductive rates reaches adult-
industrialized countries have followed, saving  hood, the proportion of working-age population
for retirement will initially become more impor-  rises sharply. Then, as baby boomers retire and
tant Ps the population growth rate declines.  die off, it declines toward the steady-state level.
To calculate the potential importance of life-  Webb and Zia simulated aggregate rates for
cycle saving (saving for retirement), Webb and  life-cycle savings for Brazil, China, Korea,
Zia set up a simulation model that translates  Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey.
demographic projections into savings-rate
projections.  Modeling explicitly the behavior of  The savings rates increase '  *r 6 percentage
each cohort of households separates the effects  points when the last baby boomers enter the
of changing population shares of children and  work force and begin to save after their children
retirees.  These shares behave differently and  leave home. The effect on life-cycle saving is
have different effects on saving as the popula-  dramatic; the effect on total savings rates, which
tion growth rate changes.  are often three or four times as high, is not.
Baseline World Bank population projections  Simulated life-cycle savings rates peak at an
assume that by the middle of the twenty-first  absolute 10 percent or less in all cases.  The
century, if not sooner, the net reproductive rate  pattems in these projections seem robust with
of women in every country will decline to 1.0, a  regard to assumptions about productivity
level that will cventually lead to a stable popula-  growth, interest rates, and age-specific participa-
tion.  As the last cohort of those bom in the  tion in the labor forcc.
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r&  -ponsibility.I.  Introduction
International  lending  has  been  a double-bladed  axe  that  cut  both  ways
for  economies  struggling  to  develop. When  borrowed  resources  came  in,  they
allowed  countries  to increase  investment  without  as  much reduction  of current
consumption  or simpl,  to consume  more.  But  the  loans  complicated  the
development  process  when they  had  to be repaid,  especially  if  the  resources
were,  by bad  luck  or bad  policy,  not  invested  in  ways that  provided  the  means
for  repayment.
This  paper  gathers  some  statistical  evidence  on the  magnitude  of
lending  and repayment  and  on the  question  of  whether  the  repayment  reduced  the
resources  available  in the  1980s  for  development.  The  evidence  largely
confirms  commonly  held  beliefs,  but  the  discussion  emphasizes  what seems  new
or controversial.  Nine  findings  stand  outs
1.  Looking  only  at long-term,  public  and  publicly  guaranteed  debt
understates  the  volume  of  commercial  lending  to the  developing  countries
before  1982  and  the  size  of  net  transfers  out  to commercial  creditors  since
1982.2
2.  For  many countries  the  stocks  of short-term  debt  or long-  term  non-
guaranteed  debt  built  up rapidly  before  1982  and  declined  sharply  since  then,
when those  types  of debt  were rescheduled  and  reclassified  as long-term
publicly  guaranteed.
3.  Most debtor  countries  have  transferred  net resources  to commercial
creditors  since  1980,  but  on  average  the (middle-income)  countries  that  have
not  had  to reschedule  their  loans  have  made  much  smaller  net  transfers  to
creditors  than  the  tountries  that  have  rescheduled.
4.  Neither  the  abs3lute  size  of a country's  debt  nor the  amount  of  World
Bank  adjustment  lending  has  had a  discernable  positive  effect  on the  net
transfers  of commercial  credit  to the  countries; indeed,  the  correlation  is
weakly  negative.
5.  There  is  a significant  negative  correlation  between  the  change  in the
resource  balance  and  the  change  in dome'tic  investment  from  the  five  years
before  1982  to  the  four  years  thereafter.
6.  The  cost  of  paying  unusually  high real  interest  rates  in the  1980s
usually  explains  less  than  a fifth  of the  debt  that  countries  have  built  up.
7.  Terms  of trade  changes  since  1978 (assuming  the  real  trade  flows  that
actually  occurred)  generally  had  dramatic  effects  on  the  incomes  of developing
countries. For  most  manufacturing  exporters  and  mae,  non-energy  primary
exporters,  the  effects  of terms-of-trade  shocks,  accumulating  with interest
from  1979  to 1986,  reduced  net  worth  by  half  or  more  of a year's  GDP.
8.  The  terms-of-trade  effects  increased  the  potential  net  worth  of oil
exporters  by even  larger  amounts,  however,  although  most  of them  did  not take
the  opportunity  to  pay  off  their  debt  and  acquire  net  assets  in the  rest  of
the  world.3
9.  There  is  not  a close  correlation  between  the  extent  that  a country
was  hurt  by terms-of-trade  changes  and  the  extent  to  which  it  is today
considered  a  problem  debtor.
II.  The  Growth  of  Debt  and  Net  Transfers  of  Resources:
External  borrowing  and  repayment  are  the  dominant  items  in the
capital  accounts  of  most  developing  countries. Table  1 shows  a statistical
survey  of the  debt  buildup  in  the  70  countries  that  are  included  in the  Report
on  Adjustment  Lending  1 (RAL1)  statistical  appendix. (These  include  all  the
important  developing  coumtries  except  China  and  India.) The  years  1978,  1982,
and  1986  were  chosen  to indicate  the  debt  situation  after  the  first  oil  shock,
after  the  second  oil  shock  (and  at the  outbreak  of the  debt  crisis),  and  after
4  years  of attempted  adjustment  to the  debt  crisis. From  1978  to 1982  the
debt  expanded  rapidly,  almost  doubling  in  nominal  terms  and  growing  about  30
percent  in real  terms. After  1982  the  growth  slowed,  in  both  nominal  and  real
terms. In the  distribution  of  debt  between  categories  of  borrowers,  the  main
changes  were that  the  share  of debt  owed  by  Latin  American  Countries  (LAC)  and
the  Highly  Indebted  Countri 4 es (HICs)  increased  between  1978  and  1982,  and  then
by 1986  it  drorped  back  what it  had  been  in 1978. Europe,  Middle-East,  and
North  Africa's  (EMENA)  share  in the  debt  owed  has  dropped  over  the  eight
years;  Asia's  has  risen.
Changes  in  the  distribution  of  debt  to  commercial  and  official
creditors reflect  developments  in  the  political  economy  of debt. From  1978
to 1982  the  middle-income  countries,  especially  the  highly  indebted  countries
(HICs),  increased  their  share  in  the  commercial  credit  to developing
countries,  but.  not in  official  credit. With  credit  readily  obtainable  from4
commercial  sources,  some  countries  did  not  want  to put  up  with the
conditionality  of official  creditors,  even  if it  could  get  them  loans  on
slightly  more favorable  terms. In some  countries,  the  private  sector  did  most
of the  external  borrowing,  without  explicit  government  guarantees.  From 1982
to 1986,  total  debt  to commercial  lenders  (from  the  RALl 70)  remained
essentially  constant  in  real  terms. (Table  1 shcws  debt  deflated  with
manufacturing  unit  value  index  of  developed  countries.)  After  1982  the  share
of  commercial  credit  to  the  HICs  fell,  but  this  was partially  offset  by an
increase  in  their  share  of the  credit  from  official  sources. The low-income
countries,  which  had  not  borrowed  heavily  from  commercial  creditors,  suffered
a decline  in  their  shares  of both  official  and  commercial  credit.
Commercial  credit  includes  public  and  publicly  guaranteed  (PPG)  long-
term  commercial  credit,  and  also  short-term  and  non-guaranteed  long-term
credit,  which  was mostly  from  commercial  creditors  to  private  borrowers. Some
of the  debt  that  started  out  as short-term  or  non-guaranteed  (PNG)  long-term
debt  had  by 1986  been reclassified  as long-  term  PPG  debt in  the
reschedulings.  The  oanks  found  that,  because  they  had  not  made sure  that
short-term  loans  were  put  to self-liquidating  uses,  they  had  to recognize  them
as long-term  obligations,  at  best.  The  developing  countries  found  that,  when
foreign-exchange  controls  prevented  private  debtors  from  servicing  non-
guaranteed  debt,  the  foreign  creditors  effectively  pressured  the  debtor
governments  to assume  the  debt.  In  many  cases  this  was the  price  for  keeping
open  the  nation's  lines  of trade  credit. Since  a substantial  part  of the
long-term  PPG  debt  in 1986  was originally  lent  as short-term  and  private  non-
guaranteed  debt,  it  seems  best  to lump  all  three  categories  together  from  the
start.5
Table  1 also  shows  the  debt  burdens  as a  percent  of GNP  and  of
exports  (Table  lb). During  the  1978-82  period,  the  total  debt  burdens  became
more similar  across  categories.  Since  1982,  however,  the  burdens  have  become
more different,  mainly  because  of diffi:ent  growth  experiences.  For
manufacturing  expotters  and  EMENA  countries,  debt  burdens  have  increased  only
moderately  since  1982. Manufacturing  prices  have  held  up relatively  well and
volumes  have grown. For  HICs,  for  oil  and  non-oil  primary  exporters, and  for
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  debt  burdens  have  grown  much faster  than  the  ability  to
pay. Many countries  devalued  their  currency  in  real  terms,  as part  of the
adjustment  process,  which  increased  their  debt/GDP  ratio.
Net  transfers  between  creditors  and  debtors  offer  another  perspective
on the  evolution  of the  debt  problem  and  countries'  efforts  to adjust.
Calculating  net resource  transfers  from  debt  data  yields  a picture  of  where
resources  are  going  to  and  coming  from  externally.  Net transfers  from
creditors  would  differ  from  the (negative)  resource  balance  by items  such  as
increased  reserves,  direct  foreign  investments,  and  unrequited  transfers. 1
Resource  balances  are  considered  separately  later. Net transfers  from  a
creditor  would  be disbursements  minus  repayments  minus  interest  paid  by the
debtor. The  estimates  of  net  transfers  in the  following  charts  and  tables  are
calculated  from  the  World  Debt  Tables. The  net  transfers  on  commercial  long-
term  debt (PPG  and  PNG)  just  sum  the  estimates  of net  transfers  in  the  Debt
Tables. For  total  commercial  transfers  we could  not use  this  method,  because
there  are  no data  on the  net  transfers  for  short-term  debt  and  only incomplete
1  The resources  balance  equals  exports  minus  imports  of goods  and  non-
factor  services. It is  about  the  same  as the  non-interest  current  account,  if
interest  payments  are  the  bulk  of factor  services.6
data  on the  amount  of short-term  debt  that  was rescheduled  or reclassified
into  long-term. To cover  the  reclassification  problem,  we calculate  total  net
transfers  from  commercial  creditors  as the  change  in  the  total  debt (stock  of
short-term  plus  long-term  (PPG  and  PNG]  debt)  minus  the  interest  rate (average
rate  of commercial  long-term  PPG)  times  the  average  total  debt  during  the
year.  This  method  also  has some  problems,  because  the  change  of  debt  also
reflects  debt forgiveness,  discounts  on equity  and local-currency  swaps,  and
exchange-rate  changes,  none  of  which  should  count  as net  transfers. Exchange-
rate  changes  are  important  for  some  years,  but  have  tended  to cancel  each
other  out  over  the  longer  periods.2 Debt  swaps  have  been  significant  for  only
a few  countries  and  only  very  recently. It seems  more important  to capture
the  negative  transfers  on short-term  debt,  as trade  credit  lines  have shrunk.
Total  official  transfers  are  t.ie  reported  transfers  on official  long-term  debt
plus  an estimate  of IMF  net transfers  --  disbursements  minus  principal
repayments  minus  an interest  rate  (average  official  long-term)  times  average
IMF  during  the  year. 3 Official  transfers  refer  to loans  only  and  thus  do  not
include  official  grants. Total  net transfers  are  the  sum  of total  commercial
2  When the  dollar  was rising,  in 1980-84,  debt increases  understate  net
flows. When the  dollar  fell,  since  early  1985,  debt increases  overstated  net
flows.  The period  1978-82  straddles  a trough  in the dollar  values;  1983-86
straddles  a hump.  Of course,  exchange  rate  changes  did  not fully  cancel  out;
the  yen  was  much  higher  in 1986  than  in 1978.
3  The IMP  has its  own terminology,  in  which disbursement  of credit  is
called  a "purchase,'  and  repayment  is a "repurchase."7
and  official  net transfers. 4 Table  2 shows  the  results  of these  calculations,
subdivided  by period,  by debtor-country  group,  and  by type  of creditor.
From  all  creditors,  the  net transfers  to  all  borrowers  were strongly
positive  in 1978-82. In  the  context  of OPEC  oil  shocks,  "Debt  was  considered
a solution  rather  than  a  problem." 5 With  two  exceptions,  net  transfers  from
every  category  of creditor  to  every  category  of debtor  declined  sharply  after
1982. To low-income  countries  total  net transfers  via lending  remained
positive,  but  declined  by over  one-half. To Sub-Saharan  Africa  net  transfers
via lending  remained  barely  positive,  but  one  must remember  that  official
grants  were important  there. For  the  other  categories  of middle-income
countries  the  total  net  transfers  became  negative,  especially  for  the  HICs  and
Latin-America,  which  overlap  considerably. 6 Counting  short-term  and  non-
guaranteed  debt  as  part  of total  debt  to commercial  creditors  makes  the  net
transfers  to them  from  middle-income  countries  more  negative  than  only
counting  long-term  public  debt. As shares  of  GNP,  transfers  to commercial
creditors  in 1983-86  averaged  almost  4Z  of GNP  for  upper-middle  income
countries  and  HIC's,  but  were lower  for  manufacturing  exporters  and  lower-
middle-income  countries.
From  official  creditors,  resource  transfers  before  1983  were  much
smaller  than  from  commercial  creditors,  except  to low-income  countries. Since
4  If  the  loan  were  reclassified  from  commercial  to  official  (e.g.,  because
of exercising  an Export-Import  Bank guarantee)  this transaction  is counted
(incorrectly)  as a negat'ive  transfer.
5  Fishlow,  1988,  p. 202.
6  See  also  Husain,  1988.8
1983  resource  transfers  from  officia:  creditors  have  remained  positive,  but  to
every  category  they  have  fallen,  except  to the  HIC's  and  Latin  America,  which
have received  more.  Partly  the  overall  decline  reflects  the  interest  burden,
and for  some  manufacturing  exporters  it  may reflect  a  positive  decision  to
borrow  less  when even  official  loans  were becoming  more expeneive  in  real
terms. The  decision  to increase  net transfers  to  Latin  America  probably
reflects  political  decisions  by creditor  governments  to use  official  lending
to avert  a  breakdown  of relations with  commercial  creditors.
Note that  the  net transfers  from  official  creditors  to  middle-income
debtors  are  far  less  than  what  commercial  creditors  took  out.  So there  has
been  no global  bail  out.  It  was  probably  more  common  that  the  carrot  of
official  lending,  small  as it  was relative  to  total  debt  of HICs,  helped  keep
debtors  at the  negotiating  table  with commercial  creditors,  who succeeded
there  in  getting  large  net  resource  transfers.
III. Resource  Transfers  and  Investment
Since  1980  most  developing  countries  have  had  negative  net resource
transfers  along  with lower  investment  rates,  and  slower  or  negative  output
growth. Some  observers  argue  that  the  primary  chain  of causal  connections  has
run  from  debt  crisis  to  negative  transfers  to  curtailed  investment  to stagnant
output  (Sachs,  1986;  Husain,  1988). Feedback  loops  only  made  matters  worse.
Did  a  more  positive  resource  balance  (corr-ponding  to  more  negative  transfer
to creditors)  lead  to  lower  investment?
The  simple  cross-sectional  correlation  between  the  share  of GDP  going
to investment  and  the share  going  to resource  balance  has  the  predicted9
negative  sign  but is  too  weak to  be significant. 7 Perhaps  this  is  because  of
differences  between  the  structure  of economies  and  the  ways of defining  the
statistics.  To  hold  tz.  se constant,  we compared  the  changes  in investment
share  and  resource-  balance  share  from  the  1979-82  period  to the  1983-86
period. Figure  1 shows  the  results. The  points  are  scattered  around  a line
through  the  origin  with  a slope  of  negative  1.0. The  one-to-one  average
correspondence  of changes  in  resource  transfers  and investment  is  consistent
with causality  in  either  direction. Diminishing  investment  opportunities  --
perhaps  due to the  interest  rate  and  terms  of trade  shocks  discussed  later
and  the  recessions  accompanying  the  initial  phases  of adjustment  --  would
lower  desired  investment  and  at the  same  time  reduce  the  resource  transfers
that  financed  it.  For  countries,  however,  the  change  in  the  financing  flow
exceeded  or  preceded  the  change  in  investment  fundamentals,  and  it appears
that  credit  constraints  caused  the  reduced  investment,  especially  in
infrastructure  and  social  investment.  Changes  in saving  can  also  be deduced
from  Figure  1.  If a  country  lies  on the  line  through  the  origin  wich slope  of
-1.0,  then  its  saving  rate  did  not  change. Countries  below  the  line  decreased
saving  by the  vertical  or horizontal  distance  from  the  line. For  instance,
Argentina  reduced  investment  by 9  per  cent  of  GNP  but  increased  resource
transfers  by only  4  percent,  implying  that  the  share  of  consumption  (although
not  the  absolute  value)  rose  by 5  percent  of  GNP.  Korea,  on the  other  hand,
increased  resource  transfers  by 7  percent  of  GNP,  but  took  only  1 percent  out
of investment,  implying  that  the  other  6 percent  came  through  more saving.
7  The  relationship  was  examined  for  the  averages  of 1979-1982  and
1983-86.10
IV.  Capital  Flight
The  capital  account  is  more than  just  borrowing  and  repaying  external
debt.  For  instance,  in 1980  developing  countries  ran  a  capital  account
surplus  of only  about  $68  billion,  while  their  outstanding  debt  rose  by $96
billion. In 1984,  debt  rose  by about  $69  billion,  while  the  capital  account
surplus  was only  $14  billion. 8 The  net inflow  of direct  investment,  which
would  make the  capital  account  more  positive,  was  more than  offset  by
accumulation  of official  reserves  and,  more importantly,  by private  purchases
of  assets  in  industrial  countries,  including  capital  flight.
Since  evasion  of taxes,  unsustainable  appreciation  of the  domestic
currency,  and  exchange  controls  often  motivate  capital  flight,  statistics  are
sparse  and  uncertain. But  the  magnitudes  are  not  trivial. Table  3 shows
estimates  of capital  flight  by two  authors. 9 Argentina,  Mexico,  and  Venezuela
account  for  most of the  capital  flight  from  the  countries  investigated.  For
those  three,  capital  flight  accounted  for  one-third  to two-thirds  of their
total  debt in  1984. For  most countries  capital  flight  has  at least  slowed
since  1984,  so its  share  in  the  total  debt  has  probably  not risen  much since
then. Most  of the  capital  flight  occurred  when  governments  could  easily
borrow  foreign  exchange  to sustain  overvalued  domestic  currencies.  More
recent  capital  flight,  for  instance  from  Brazil,  has  mostly  had  to go through
8  World  Bank  Debt  Tables  1987-88;  IMF,  IFS. Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait,  Middle
East  unspecified,  and  South  Africa  were subtracted  from  the  IFS  capital  account
total  for  developing  countries,  because  the  Debt  Tables  do not include  them.
9  The  two  estimation  methods  in  Khan  and  Haqu^  1987  give  similar  results.11
the  more arduous  route  of actual  (if  not  fully  reported)  export  surpluses.
For  the  evolution  of its  debt  burden,  it  makes  little  difference  in the  short-
run  whether  their  citizens  used  the  foreign  exchange  to import  consumption
goods  or to  buy  undeclared  foreign  assets  --  capital  flight. In either  case
the  borrowed  resources  do  not  generate  productive  assets  to help  service  the
debt.  But  in the  longer-term  there  is  a  big  difference. If the  investment
climate  improves  at  home,  holders  of flight  capital  can  liquidate  their
foreign  assets  with interest  and  bring  home the  funds  for  domestic
investment. 10 Of course,  the  key  caveat  is,  if the  investment  climate
improves  at home.
Table  2 also  shows  the  resource  balance  as a share  of  GNP for  the
various  categories  of countries. The  difference,  noted  earlier,  between  net
transfers  from  creditors  and  the  negative  resource  balance  of the  developing
country  parallels  the  distinction  between  the  increase  of debt  and  the
negative  current  account  balance  (plus  reserve  changes). For  lower-income
countries  grants  may  account  for  much  of the  difference  between  net  transfers
to  creditors  and  the  resource  balance. For  middle-income  countries,  there  is
a discrepancy  before  1982,  which  could  reflect  capital  flight,  but  little
difference  since  then.
10  If domestic  investment  in a market  with serious  distortion  were the
alternative  use  of funds  that  went  to  capital  flight,  then  the  country  might  be
better off in the long run if funds were invested  abroad in higher-yield
projects. But  capital  flight  is  pernicious  to  the  extent  that  its  benefits  only
go  to a privileged  few  and  that  it increases  the  need  of governments  to  borrow
abroad  and  reduces  the  tax  base.12
V.  Credit  Availability
The  amount  of its  scheduled  debt  service  that  a  country  pays  with
current  earnings,  rather  than  finances,  depends  on the  relationship  of the
debtor  country  with its  commercial  banks  and  official  creditors. Let  us
consider  three  factors  that  might  influence  net  resource  flows  from  commercial
creditors: past  payment  record,  the  threat  of default,  and  World  Bank
adjustment  loans.
When a country  runs  out  of ftmds  to  meet its  debt  obligations,  it
typically  goes  through  a rescheduling  with its  creditors,  and  then  its  future
borrowing  is  tightly  constrained.  Figures  2A and  B compare  net transfers
before  and  after  1982  for  middle-income  countries  that  did  and  did  not  go into
arrears  or require  repeated  reschedulings  in  the  1980s. (Appendix  I lists  the
countries  in  each  category.) From  commercial  creditors  the  countries  that
eventually  rescheduled  got  higher  net transfers  before  1982  but  have  had  much
more  negative  transfers  since  then. Much  of the  theoretical  analysis  of
sovereign  debtors  assumes  that  they  are  motivated  to  pay  anything  only  by the
prospects  for  positive  (present  value)  net  transfers  in the  future,  but this
could  hardly  explain  the  facts  at  hand (see  Eaton,  Stiglitz  and  Gersowitz,
1986  for  a survey). No creditors  are  considering  making  future  positive  net
transfers  large  enough  to outweigh  the  negative  net transfers  of the  mid
1980s. Some  other  motive  must  be dominant,  perhaps  the  fear  of trade
reprisals  or the  high  convenience  value  of access  to trade  credit  and  use  of
international  banking  services. From  official  creditors  in  1978-82,  the
problem  debtors-to-be  were  receiving  lower  net transfers.  This is  consistent
with the  hypothesis  mentioned  earlier  that  HICs  preferred  to  borrow  in  the
commercial  market  where  they  did  not  have  to  worry  about  the  policy13
conditionality  required  by official  lenders. Since  1983  creditworthy  and
problem  debtors  (middle-income)  have shared  about  equally  in the  net transfers
from  official  creditors.
Another  approach  to  net  transfers  to commercial  creditors  is to  ask
why some  credit-constrained  debtors  get  away  with  weaker  efforts  to repay  than
others. One theory  takes  off  from  Keynes's  observation  that  a debtor  owning  a
hundred  pounds  is at the  mercy  of its  creditors,  while  a  debtor  owing  a
million  pounds  has the  creditors  at its  mercy. Sachs  and  Huizinga  claim  that
big  debtors,  whose  debt  is  an important  share  in  banks'  portfolios,  have  used
the  threat  of default  to  get  more generous  reschedulings  than  smaller  debtors
could  obtain  (1987). Figure  3 shows  a  more complex  picture. Among  the  middle
income  debtors  owing  less  than  $50  billion,  a larger  absolute  debt (in  1982)
correlates  negatively  with  net  transfers  from  commercial  creditorG  as  a share
of GNP,  which  would  suggest  less  generous  reschedulings.  Excluding  Brazil  and
Medico  the  correlation  coefficient  is  negative  0.34 (and  is  statistically
significant  at 52 significance  level). Maybe  for  mid-size  debtors  the  banks
will put  forth  more  effort  to  collect  than  for  small  debtors. For  the  two
biggest  debtors,  Mexico  and  Brazil,  there  does  seem  to  be some  truth  to Sach's
claim,  because  their  net  transfers  are  less  negative  than  the  mid-size
debtors. Mexico  and  Brazil  also  have,  however,  prospects  for  long-term  growth
that  are  better  than  most  developing  countries;  so  more generous  lending  might
be economically  justified  (Webb  1987).
Policy-based  lending  by the  World  Bank is supposed  to  have
synergistic  effects  in encouraging  more  lending  by other  creditors. There  are
many reasons  why one  would  not  expect  more  adjustment  lending  by the  Bank  to
correlate  one-to-one  with larger  net  transfers  from  other  creditors. Still,14
some  positive  correlation  would  help  vindicate  the  argument  that  adjustment
lending  serves  to  attract  commercial  credit. Such  a correlation  does  not
show,  however,  in Figures  4A,  B,  C, D and  E.  Indeed,  the  average  net
transfers  from  creditors  (not  counting  Adjustment  Lending)  to countries
getting  structural  adjustment  loans  (SALs)  and  sectoral  adjustment  loans
(SECALs)  was less  than  the  average  transfers  to  countries  not  getting  any
SALs. For  middle-income  countries  the  negative  relation  between  net transfers
and  having  a SAL  was stronger  for  commercial  creditors  than  for  official.
Surprisingly,  the  negative  relation  between  net  transfers  and  having  a SAL  or
SECAL  was stronger  for  IDA  countries  than  for  Bank  borrowers. Presumably
there  are  some  selection  biases  here. Countries  which  cannot  get  positive  net
flows  from  other  creditors  turn  to  the  Bank  and  IDA  for  SALs. Countries  with
higher  external  debt  and  thus  higher  scheduled  negative  resource  transfers  may
be more likely  to get  adjustment  lending. Among  countries  which (needed  and)
got  SALs,  there  is  no clear  positive  or  negative  relationship  between  the
amount  of SAL (and  SECAL)  lending  and  transfers  from  the  aggregate  of other
creditors. For  official  creditors  there  is a  positive  relation  with a
correlation  coefficient  of .44. With  net  transfers  from  commercial  creditors
to  middle-income  countries,  however,  the  Bank's  adjustment  lending  seems
weakly  negatively  correlated  (with  a correlation  coefficient  of -. 15).
Overall,  if the  SALs  and  SECALs  have  any  synergistic  effects  in  making  the
recipients  attractive  targets  for  other  lenders,  those  effects  were too  subtle
to show  up in these  charts  (see  correlation  coefficients  at bottom  of charts).
Perhaps  one  needs  more  time  to see  the  effects  of adjustment  policy.15
VI.  Trade  Flows
The  real  values  of exports  and  imports,  shown  as indices  in  Tables
4A,  B and  C, indicate  the  extent  and  mode  of capital  flows  and  real
adjustment.* For  every  aggregation  in  Table  4A (except  India),  real  exports
increased  relative  to the  volume  of imports  in  the  1980s;  in  most cases  the
imports  fall  while  exports  rose. For  HICs,  real  exports  rose  by almost  one
fifth,  and  4'ports  fell  by one  fifth. Major  countries  that  raised  real  export
by  well over  one-half  from  1980  to 1986  --  Turkey,  Korea,  Pakistan,  Thailand,
Malaysia  --  have  not  had severe  debt-servicing  difficulties,  and  have
maintained  voluntary  access  to commercial  credit. Mexico,  the  Philippines,
and  Brazil  became  HICs,  however,  despite  export  growth  in the  15 and  40
percent  range. Some  commodity  and  oil  exporters  nad  slow  growing  exports,
like  Argentina  and  Cote  d'Ivoire,  or  even  saw  exports  decline,  like  Indonesia,
Jamaica,  Nigeria,  and  Zambia.
The  countries  that  maintained  strong  export  growth  and  avoided  debt
servicing  difficulties  have sustained  real  growth  of imports,  shown  in  Table
4C.  All the  HICs,  on the  other  hand,  have reduced  real  imports. Argentina,
Nigeria  and  Zambia  have  cut  them  by over  one-half.
A study  comparing  the  HICs  and  10  major  non-HICs  found  that,  while
the  two  groups  had  nearly  identical  statistical  profiles  in 1980-82,  the  non-
HICs  had  distinguished  themselves  with  much  more rapid  export  growth  since  the
*  The real  values  are  calculated  as the  nominal  flows  divided  by the  MUV,
which  is  the  World  Bank's  index  of  Manufactures  Unit  Value  --  the  dollar  unit
value  of G-5  exports  of  manufactures  to developing  countries.16
debt  crisis  started  in 1982. The  rapid  export  growth  seems  to explain  the
continued  access  on the  non-HICs  to commercial  bank  credit  although  a few
countries,  like  Korea,  have reduced  their  total  debt.  The  debt  and  imports  of
the  non-HICs  continued  to grow  rapidly. (Corbo,  1989.)
V.  Counterfactual  Stimulation
Rapid  build-up  of external  debt  often  signals  a country's  need for
structural  adjustment.  But  to evaluate  the  success  of adjustment  and
adjustment  lending,  one  cannot  look  merely  at the  absolute  level  of a
country's  debt  or even  its  ratio  to  GNP  or exports. Since  the  onset  of the
debt  crisis  in  1982  every  debtor  country  has  become  more  indebted,  even  though
they  have taken  adjustment  measures,  with varying  degrees  of success. High
real  interest  rates  and  adverse  movements  of the  terms  of trade  account  for
some  of the  increase  in  debt  of the  developing  countries,  but  these  effects
vary  widely. To estimate  the  effects  of changing  real  interest  rates  and
terms  of trade,  one  must  have some  idea  of  what  would  have  happened  without
those  changes. This  section  reports  the  results  of counterfactual  simulations
of the  change  in  country's  net  worth  with  the same  real  trade  flows  but
alternate,  historically  more "normal"  patterns  of prices  and  interest  rates  on
commercial  debt. The  counterfactuals  take  into  account  the  compounding  of
interest  on extra  borrowing  to  pay  higher  interest  or finance  the  losses  due
to terms-of-trade  shifts. The  counterfactuals  should  not  be  viewed  as  general
equilibrium  forecasts  of  what  would  have  happened  with  a different  path  of
prices  and interest  rates.11 Rather,  they  highlight  the  nominal  effects  of
11  See  Corbo  and  de  Melo 1987  for  such  an  exercise.17
price  changes  (regarding  the interest  rateralso  as  a price)  while  holding  the
underlying  real  quantities  constant.
To compare  the  cumulative  impact  of changes  in real  interest  rates
and  terms  of trade  over  the  years  1979-86,  we would  like  to  have  something
like  the  present  value  of total  lost  and  gained  consumption  opportunities.
This  should  be the  present  value  of changes  made  in current  consumption  plus
the  changes  in  net  worth,  assets  usable  for  future  consumption.  To
approximate  this  result,  the  calculation  focuses  on  net  worth,  with  no change
assumed  in  consumption.  The  effects  of external  conditions  were treated  as
changes  in  debt  service  paid  to commercial  creditors,  which  affected  with
compounding  interest  the  country's  net  worth. The  calculations  assume,  in
other  words,  that  real  trade  flows  did  not react  to interest-rate  and  terms-
of-trade  changes  and  therefore  that  the  entire  shock  was financed  externally.
Real trade  flows  did  change  in response  to shocks,  of course,  which
means  that  there  was also  some  domestic  adjustment.  We do not  model  that,  but
we can  tell  how it  affects  our  interpretation  of results. If investment  did
all  the  domestic  adjustment  --  say,  by reduced  imports  of  machinery  to
compensate  for  the  loss  of coffee  revenues  --  and  if the  foregone  domestic
investment  would  have returned  the  world  interest  rate,  then  we can  still  say
that  the  external  shock  altered  net  worth  one-for-one.  Evidence  in  Figure  1
supports  the  interpretation  that  the  domestic  side  of adjustment  fell
predominantly  on investment.
For the  part  of  domestic  adjustment  made  by changing  consumption,  we
can  say  that  calculating  the  impact  on  net  worth  is  equivalent  to accumulating
the  value  of foregone  consumption,  using  the  world  interest  rate  as the
consumers'  discount  rate. In  other  words,  the  net  worth  changes  in the18
counter  factual  calculation  can  be interpreted  as the  accumulation  of the
combined  changes  in foreign  debt,  domestic  capital  stock,  and  consumption.  Of
course,  the  composition  of the  response  varied  from  country  to country,  and
there  are  some  systematic  patterns.
Commercial  long-term  (PPG  and  PNG)  and  short-term  debt  are  all
assumed  to carry  the  same  interest  rate  as  was actually  paid  on long-term  PPG
debt.  For  other  private  debt  there  are  no data  on the  interest  paid.  If
commercial  debt  becomes  negative  in the  counterfactual  --  the  country  becomes
a creditor  with the  private  financial  sector  --  the  interest  rate  earned  is
assumed  to be LIBOR. The  counterfactuals  assume  that  financing  from  official
sources  occurred  independently  from  the  debtor's  situation  vis a  vis
commercial  creditors. Although  some  debtors  received  extra  official  loans  to
help  with  commercial  debt  problems,  as suggested  earlier,  and  obviously  the
amount  of  new  commercial  financing  depended  on the  pre-existing  stock  of debt,
these  relationships  were complex  and  varied  widely  across  countries.
The  counterfactual  estimates  are  built  up in several  simple  steps.
The  actual  debt  at the  end  of period  t  equals  the  debt  at the  end  of  period
t-l,  plus  interest  on that  debt,  minus  the  resource  balance  in  period  t,  plus
net  borrowing  for  purposes  other  than  financing  interest  payments  on imports.
(The  last  item  would  cover  direct  investment,  reserve  changes,  and  capital
flight. In the  World  Debt  Tables,  it  also  includes  exchange-rate  effects.)
Debtt  =  Debtt_l  +  Debtt_ 1 *  rt_l  - Res  Balt  + Other  Net  Borrowingt  (1)19
The  counterfactuals  simulate  the  build-up  of debt  with  alternate  assumptions
about  the  interest  rate  r and  trade  prices,  which  result  in  a counterfaetual
resource  balance.
CF Debtt  - CF Debtt_l  *(l  +  CF rt)  - CF Res  Balt
+  Other  Net  Borrowingt  (2)
Since  we want to  use the  actual  Other  Net  Borrowing  in the  counterfactual,
that  is  obtained  by solving  for  it in  equation  (1)  and  plugging  the  result
into  equation  (2). The  results  of the  counterfactual  are  measured  as  a gain
in  net  worth --  as the  difference  between  the  simulation  of debt  with the
counterfactual  and  the  simulation  of debt  with the  actual  long-term  interest
rate  and  actual  resource  balance. The  simulated  actual  debt  was usually  very
close  to the  actual,  but  the  comparison  of simulations  seemed  the  most
accurate  way to  measure  the  effects  of the  counterfactual  assumptions  and  to
exclude  the  effects  of the  method  of simulation.
Interest  Rate  Shocks
On interest  rates,  the  counterfactual  we are  trying  to  evaluate  is
that  the  real  rates  in international  markets  stayed  around  their  historic
average. Table  5 shows  the  recent  history  of  world  interest  rates  and
inflation. The  double-digit  nominal  interest  rates,  which  were showing
inflation  in  the  US,  were  causing  the  prices  of internationally  traded  goods
to drop,  even for  industrial  countries. This  pushed  real  interest  rates  up to
almost  20 percent. Some  developing  countries  were paying  even  more.  Of
course,  this  was far  above  historic  norms. For  1963-86,  LIBOR  minus  the
inflation  of the  MUV index  averaged  2.5  percent  per  annum. Spreads  and  fees
would  make the  effective  rate  to  developing-country  borrowers  somewhat  higher.20
The  counterfactual  interest-rate  calculation  assumes  that  the  real  interest
rate  stayed  at 4  percent,  and  thus  that  the  nominal  rate  equalled  inflation  of
the  MUV  plus 4  percent. Varying  the  counterfactual  real  rate  up or down  by a
point  does  not  make  a dramatic  difference.  Pour  percent  is  above  the  ex post
real  rate  that  prevailed  during  the  debt  build-up,  prior  to 1982,  but  we want
to highlight  what the  exceptionally  high  structure  of real  rates  in the  1980s
contributed  to the  debt  build-up  for  developing  countries. We want to  avoid
the  criticism  that  the  results  are  driven  by an  assumption  that  commercial
banks  would  give  away  money  at below-market  rates  in  the  counterfactual.
Assuming  a 4  percent  real  interest  rate  since  1978  would  rais'a  the
net  worth  of  most  countries  by 1986,  compared  with actual  rates. (A  few
countries  would  have  been  worse  off  in the  counterfactual,  because  they
actually  did  not pay  much  of the  intetest  owed.) As one  would  expect,  the
countries  and  regions  that  relied  most on  commercial  financing  were hardest
hit  by interest  rate  shocks. Tables  6A,  B and  C show  results  by region  and
country. The  4 percent  real  rate  on commercial  credit  would  have  made  most
countries  worse  off  in the  late  1970s  but  would  have  helped  them  in the  1980s.
This  result  is sensitive  to  the  price  numeraire. In earlier  calculations  with
the  US GNP  deflator,  which  only  slowed  its  inflation  rate,  the  net  worth  gains
in the  interest  rate  counterfactuals  were less  over  the  whole  period. With
the  US GDP  deflator,  usually  more gain  showed  up in  the  terms  of trade
counterfactual.  On the  other  hand,  with the  industrial-country  trade  prices
as  numeraire,  more  gains  showed  up  with the  interest  rate  counterfactual  and21
less  in the  terms  of trade  counterfactual. 12 This  happened  because  the
industrial  trade  prices  dropped  sharply  in  the  early  1980s,  pushing  actual
real  rates  to 20 percent  or  more.
Another  counterfactual  scenario,  in  which  all  countries  who  paid
their  interest  do better,  starts  with the  actual  debt  at the  end  of 1980  and
assumes  the  constant  4 percent  re.l  rate  from  1981  through  1986. We can  think
of this  as the  soft-landing  counterfactual  --  Paul  Volcker  stops  inflation  but
restarts  money  growth  in time  to  keep  real  interest  rates  from  going  up high
as they  did.  The right-hand  parts  of Tables  6A,  B and  C show  that  by 1986  the
accumulated  impact  high interest  rates  since  1980  had  lowered  net  worth  of
HICs  and  LAC  countries  by about  152. For  other  groups  the  impact  was smaller.
We can  also  evaluate  this  gain  by asking  how  much  lower  would  their  debt  be if
countries  had  not  borrowed  to  pay  higher  interest  rates  associated  with the
hard landing. Venezuela,  Ecuador,  Yugoslavia,  and  Mexico  were  hardest  hit;
real  rates  above  42 in  the  1980s  accounted  to  over  30  percent  of their  debt  by
1986. Other  major  Latin  debtors  would  have  had  20-30  percent  less  debt  with
the  soft  landing.
Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  if real  interest  rates  had  not sunk
so  abnormally  low  in the  late  seventies  countries  would  nit  have  borrowed  as
heavily,  but  modelling  prudence  in  primary  borrowing  as a function  of the
current  real  interest  rate  lies  beyond  the  scope  of the  paper. It  might  be
difficult  to construct  a plausible  model  of rational  decision  making  that
would  replicate  the  borrowing  patterns  of the  1970s  and  early  1980s.
12  These  trade  prices  are  the  average  of  the  dollar  unit  value  of  exports
and  dollar  unit  value  of imports  for industrial  countries,  as reported  in the
IMF,  IFS.22
Figures  5A,  B, C, and  D show  the  change  of investment  and  resource
balance  (1983-86  compared  to 1979-82)  compared  with  the  networth  gain  in the
interest-rate  counterfactual  (plus  means  real  interest  rates  in 1979-86  were
higher  than  1969-78). As the  correlation  coefficients  at the  bottom  of the
charts  show,  there  are  no significant  correlations  for  middle  or low-income
countries.
Terms  of  Trade  Shocks
Table  7 shows  terms  of  trade  relative  to the  base  period  1969-78,
which  is 1.00.  The  typical  manufacturing  exportex  started  with terms  of trade
in  1978  at  or below  the  average  of the  previous  decade;  terms  of trade  then
worsened,  because  of oil  price  movement,  with some  recovery  in  1985-86.13
Most oil  exporters  had  a reciprocal  and  more  dramatic  experience,  with terms
of trade  peaking  in 1980-82,  then  falling. 14 Primary  exporters  (all  others)
had  a  mixed  experience  with terms  of trade  since  1978,  which  was generally
more  negative  than  positive.
The  second  set  of counterfactual  scenarios  focuses  on the  impact  of
changes  in the  debtor  country's  terms  of trade. The  counterfactual  scenario
assumes  that  the  country's  export  and  import  prices  moved  with the  MUV
(manufactured  unit  value)  index,  at the  same  ratio  as in 1969-78,  but  that  the
volume  of exports  and  imports  followed  their  actual  paths. Thus  the
counterfactual  trade  flows  incorporate  the  effects  on real  trade  flows  of the
13  Tunisia  is an  exception,  because  it also  exports  oil.
14  Egypt  and  especially  Cameroon  had  the  misfortune  to get  their  exports
of oil  booming  when its  price  was coming  down.23
changes  in incomes,  real  exchange  rates,  trade  taxes  and  subsidies,  and  other
policies  that  actually  occurred. The  formulas  for  the  counterfactual  values
(in  current  dollars)  of  exports  of goods  and  non-factor  services  are:
Exportst  (lcu)
CF Exports  t (S)  pexports,  (lcu)*  e
t  1980
1978  pexports (lcu)
*  1  E  i  *MUV
10  i-1969  M4Vi  *ei  t
where  e is the  exchange  rate. LCU  means  local  currency  unit.  The  first  term
is the  real  value  of exports  in  1980  dollars. The  second  term  is the  average
price  of exports  relative  to the  unit-value  index  of  manufactured  imports. 15
The  product  of the  first  two  terms  is the  counterfactual  value  of  exports  in
1980  dollars,  discussed  earlier  and  shown  in  Table  4b.  The  final  term
reflates  the  value  up to current  dollars,  which  is  necessary  to  make it
comparable  with  debt  data. Counterfactual  imports  are  calculated  in  the  same
way.
The  improvement  in the  resource  balance  (exports  minus  imports  of
goods  and  non-factor  services)  that  would  have  taken  place  each  year if
1969-1978  terms  of trade  had  continued  is  presented  in  Tables  8A  and  B.  It is
the  resource  balance  in the  counterfactual  scenario  minus  the  actual  resource
balance. A positive  CF  Gain shows  how  much  greater  country's  resource  balance
would  have  been if  1969-1978  relative  prices  had  continued,  and  therefore  how
much its  balance  worsened  as  a result  of  the  terms-of-trade  changes  that
15 The  1980  exchange  rate  appears  again  in  order  to  index  the  exchange  rate
to 1980,  like  the  other  prices  in  the  summation.24
actually  occurred. A negative  CF  Gain  means  that  the  country  (typically  an
oil  exporter)  would  have  had  a lower  or  more  negative  resource  balance  with
1969-1978  relative  prices  and  that  it  benefited  from  the  terms-of-trade  that
actually  prevailed.
The  CF Networth  Gains  in  Tables  9A,  and  9B  are  positive  for  majority
of the  developing  countries,  which  were  hurt  by the  second  oil shock  in 1979
and  have  only  in the  late  1980s  faced  terms  of trade  again  that  are  as
favorable  as in  the  decade  leading  up to  1978.  Many  countries  gained,
however,  from  the  post  1978  terms  of trade. Indeed,  the  total  of their  gains
was larger  than  the  losses  by the  majority. Clearly,  the  export  composition
is decisive. The  decline  in  non-oil  primary  product  prices  importantly
contributed  to the  deterioration  of the  terms  of trade  of  many developing
countries. Copper  exporters  especially  suffered  from  terms-of-trade  changes,
relative  to the  counterfactual,  and  oil  exporters  especially  benefitted.
Table  9B  shows  the  counterfactual  gains  of individual  countries,  grouped  by
export  category.
Chile,  Brazil,  Jamaica,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Madagascar,  Philippines,  Zaire
and Zambia --  countries  with problematic levels of debt --  would have had net
worth  higher  by 25  percent  or  more  of GNP (1986)  if  the  1969-1978  terms  of
trade  had  continued. In  all  these  countries,  except  Zaire  and  Jamaica,  the
investment  shares  declined  from  1979-82  to 1983-86  by at least  4 percent  of
GNP  and  as much  as 12  percent. (See  Figure  1.)  Resource  transfers  to
foreigners  rose  about  the  same  amount  as investment  declined. In other  words,
there  was substantial  domestic  adjustment  in  these  countries,  and  most of it
took  place  on the  investment  side. Consumption  stagnated  or declined  only
proportionally  with  GNP.25
In other  countries  that  have  not  become  ptoblem  debtors  --  Korea,
Hungary,  Pakistan,  Portugal,  Thailand,  and  Turkey  --  terms  of trade  changes
can  also  account  for  net  worth  being  lower  by over  25  percent  of GNP.  In
these  countries,  however  the  investment  shares  of GNP  declined  by less  than  3
percent  from  1977-82  to 1983-86  or even  rose  slightly,  as in  the  case  of
Turkey. Strong  growth  has  continued  through  the  1980s,  partly  as a cause  and
partly  as an effect  of sustained  investment  shares. Korea  was the  most  highly
indebted  of these  countries  in  1982,  relative  to  GNP,  but  the  strong  increase
of its  saving  effort  and  especially  its  rapid  export  growth  convinced
commercial  creditors  to  keep  open  the  lines  of credit,  which  are  now  being
paid  off. Turkey  and  Hungary  started  the  decade  with relatively  closed
economies  and  low  debt  to  GDP ratio,  and  their  reforms  to  open  up trade  made
them  attractive  borrowers  on international  markets. Hungary  has  become  a
problem  debtor. Turkey  and  Pakistan  have  also  had  a lot  of official  lending.
In the  counterfactual  scenarios,  several  of the  countries  become  net
creditors  to the  international  commercial  financial  sector. This  does  not,  of
course,  imply  that  we think  Turkey  and  Kenya  would  now  be big  net  cieditors  if
the  1978  terms  of trade  had  continued.  With  more  favorable  terms  of trade,
the  countries  might  have  borrowed  less  and  what  they  borrowed  could  have
financed  greater  real  inflows  of resources  for  investment.
The  oil  exporters,  such  as  Mexico,  and  Venezuela,  Nigeria,  and
Indonesia,  benefitted  greatly  from  the  path  of relative  prices  since  1978,  but
they  became  problem  debtors  anyway. So  did  a few  non-oil  exporters,  such  as
Argentina. If they  had saved  the  windfall  gains  from  the  second  oil shock,
they  would  have  quickly  become  net  creditors  and  would  have  benefited  from  the
high  real  interest  rates  of the  1980s. When  the  terms  of trade  improved  for26
oil  exporters,  they  adjusted  mainly  by increasing  domestic  investment  in  the
oil sector. There  was  negative  adjustment  externally,  as the  high oil  prices
improved  the  access  of  oil  exporters  to  commercial  financing. (Here  is  where
Indonesia  and  Colombia,  not  to  mention  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait,  differ  from
the  oil  exporters  that  became  problem  debtors.)
It seems  that  some  oil importers  and  their  creditors  treated  the
post-1978  terms-of-trade  changes  as temporary  and  advisable  to finance. This
was only  partially  true  and  evidently  less  true  than  was  assumed  for  the
countries  that  have  gotten  into  debt  difficult.  es.  Even the  most rational
bankers  and  finance  ministers  could  make such  mistakes  in forecasting  prices.
But it  was  not rationally  consistent  to lend  heavily  at the  same  time  to oil-
exporting  countries  that  were benefiting  from  the  relative  price  changes  in
1979-82,  as if these  changes  were  permanent.
There  does  not seem  to  be any  clear  correlation  between  terms-of-
trade  shocks  and  the  changes  of resource  balance  or of investment  from  the
1978-82  to 1983-86. Figures  6A,  B,  C, and  D show  the  scatter  plots  for  middle
and  low-income  countries  and  the  correlation  coefficients  which  range  from
0.00  to 0.21  indicating  little  or  no relationship.
We have  also  looked  at the  combined  impact  on  net  worth  of terms-of-
trade  and interest-rate  shocks  (Tables  10A,  B,  and  C).  The  results  reflect
the  same  general  trends  as in  each  of the  separate  counterfactual  simulations
reported  in  tables  6A and  9A.  Counter-factual  networth  gains  are  positive  for
most of the  developing  countries. Groups  of countries  that  gained  from  the
combination  of terms  of trade  and  interest-rate  shock  are  the  oil  exporters,
Africa  (including  Nigeria),  and  Asia (excluding  India).27
VIZ.  Conclusions
Terms  of trade  shocks  have  had  massive  effects  on demand  for  and
usage  of international  financing. It is  rational  to finance  some  negative
terms  of trade  shocks,  partially  offsetting  the  temporary  ones  and  perhaps
showing  some  impacts  of the  permanent  ones.  The  counterpart,  however,  to
financing  negative  shocks  is for  the  international  finance  community  to
require  countries  with  positive  terms  of trade  shocks  to borrow  less  or to
repay. If  Mexico  and  Venezuela  had  been  reducing  their  debt  ratios  after
1979,  Mexico  would  not  have started  the  crisis  in 1982. And  commercial  banks
would  have  had the  more leeway  to  maintain  a longer  term  perspective  with
other  debtors.
For  middle-income  countries,  net transfers  to and  from  commercial
creditors  dwarf  the  resource  transfers  from  official  creditors. Thus,  until
1982  many big  debtors  could  ignore  official  conditionality  without  serious
financial  consequences.  Since  1983,  resource  transfers  from  official  lenders
to  HICs  have  increased  and  have  effectively  recycled  to pay  net transfers  out
to  commercial  creditors,  rather  than  to finance  the  investment  necessary  to
complement  reformed  policies. At least  for  the  middle-income  countries,  it
seems  that  official  adjustment  lending  can  meet its  objectives  only  if
coordinated  with commercial  lending.
External  shocks  have seriously  hurt  some  economies  and  have  helped
others. But the  strength  and  direction  of the  shocks  do not  explain  which
middle-income  countries  now  have  difficulties  servicing  their  commercial  debt.
One  cannot  argue  from  the  evidence  here that  the  HICs  and  their  commercial
creditors  deserve  a bailout  because  they  were  especially  hard  hit  by external
circumstances  beyond  their  control.28
Lower-income  countries  rely  more on official  financing  (and  grants)
as  external  sources  of resources  for  investment.  Since  1983  these  countries
have seen  net transfers  from  official  creditors  (not  counting  grants)  fall,
although  often  their  financing  needs  have grown  and  their  policies  improved.
Furthermore,  investment  may be  more sensitive  to the  resource  balance  in low
income  countries  than  in  middle  income  countries.  A less  developed  country
has a less  efficient  domestic  financial  structure  and  weaker  links  from  its
own  private  sector  to international  capital  markets. Good  investment  projects
are  unlikely  to get financing  unless  there  is official  lending. One  could
argue,  therefore,  that  increased  official  lending  would  have  a  more favorable
impact  on the  resource  balance  and  domestic  investment  for  lower  income
countries  than  for  middle-income  countries  with  high commercial  debts.29
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TABLE  IA
ODt Ratia  in Key  Yuri  for  RALI  Countris
RALI  Noinal Debt  (Ia11  19'u  192  19
Total Dbt  $335,676  86U,948  $846,119
- Comercial  LT (PPO)  1117,112  8229,524  1381,M
- Comweial  LT  I ST  I PU  $234,09  847,408  $54,707
- Official  &  IIF  $100,780  7170,539  8297,52
RALI  Real  Dbt - 190 dollars ISM
Total Debt  U416,90  852,823  $746,199
- Comrcial  LT (PP8)  6145,481  8231,411  8336,237
- Comercial LT  L ST  I  PN  *291,795  *8uo,m  483,898
- Official  I  IIF  $125,193  5172,088  8262,374
as===  as,sts  s  saa  :  :  :  w  a  a  s  s
Shire of Total RALI  Debt  Total Debt  as Percent  of  WP
FroD  All Creditors
1978  1982  1986  1979  1982  1996
Total RALI  1001  100?  100?  33?  452  612
Low  Incom  11?  9?  102  401  491  651
Riddle Income  892  912  902  331  45?  601
Highly Indebted  572  601  572  311  45?  63?
Nanufacturing  Exporters  421  40?  40?  292  42?  511
Prieary  Goods  Exporters  26?  29?  29?  381  582  75?
Oil Exporters  32?  32?  312  35?  421  65?
LAC  472  51t  47?  341  49?  632
Asia  18?  192  21?  332  44?  602
ENEMA  24?  201  21?  3.62  45?  51
SSAF  10?  102  11%  26:  36?  702
Share  of Comercial  k  ST  I PNG  Debt  Courcial  LT  S  ST  S PN6  Debt
7o RALI  Comercial  S ST  I PN6  hebt  as  Percent  of 6NP
1978  1992  1986  1978  1982  1986
Total RALI  100?  1002  100?  2?  33?  39
Los  Incose  52  3?  2?  12?  12?  10?
Middle  Income  951  971  9"?  24?  351  43?
Highly Indebted  67?  701  66?  261  39?  4n
Manufacturing  Exporters  43?  402  41?  21?  312  34?
Primary  60ods  Exporters  22?  25?  24?  23?  892  401
Oil Exporters  35?  352  35?  27?  4?  482
LAC  57?  602  56?  292  42?  491
Asia  16?  189  20?  :ox  307  37%
EIENA  19?  152  !8?  20!  26?  30?
SSAF  9?  n  6?  142  17?  252
Share  of  Official  Debt  I  IMF  Credit  Official  Dbt  S  IlF Credit
to RALi  Official  &  IMF  Credit  as Percent  of GNP
1978  1982  1996  1979  1982  1986
Total RALI  100?  1002  1007  :02  12?  21?
Low  Incoue  t26  27?  24t  2I?  372  542
Middil Income  74?  732  7t  8?  10?  182
Highly  Indebted  32?  !22  40'  52  6?  16I
Manufacturing  Exporters  39?  40?  t39  8?  112  17?
Primary  Goods  Exporters  34?  362  38?  152  201  :.2
Oil Exporters  27?  232  232  92  92  17%
LAC  25?  24?  30?  52  6t  !42
Asia  24?  242  23?  132  14?  23?
ENEMA  351  313  27?  162  201  24?
SSAF  162  192  20?  122  19?  45231
TAKLE  13
Debt  Ratios  in Key  Years
Total  Debt  As  Percent  of Exports
1978  1982  1986
Low  Incose  2601  333Z  4261
Niddle  Incose  183%  219Z  284Z
Highly  Indebted  222%  2871  3d9%
Manufacturing  Exporters  201%  2242  239Z
Primary  Goods  Exporters  170%  2711  343%
Oil Exporters  191%  200%  352Z
LAC  257X  319%  4321
Asia  128Z  156%  1871
EHENA  2001  1812  241Z
SSAF  126X  205%  343X32  TAKE  2
Not Transfer%  From  Creditors  to Developing  Countries
failliom dollus  per year)  (prcnt  of  WIP)  (percent of  WI)
Negtive of
All Creditws  All Creditors  Resource  llmuce
1971-82  1913-h  1978-l  82  13-U  1970-82  1983-86
Lwlncme  84,67!  82,064  4.21  1.71  10.02  3.7n
Middle  Incoe  126,34  (526,7821  2.41  -2.2t  2.7n  -1.61
Oil Exporters  ",17I  (11,2021  2.12  -2.5!  0.6  -3.01
Manufacturing  Exporterc  S11,565  tl10,0531  2.01  -1.71  4.8!  0.1t
Prieary  Bcode  Exporters  512,697  (l3,:02)  4.41  -1.01  4.5  l 12.
Highly Indeted  516,826  (525,  989  2.11  -3.41  2.0!  -3.71
LAC  813,194  521,872)  2.1t  -3.61  1.3!  -4.51
ASIA  59,346 (S1,9971  3.41  -0.71  2.n  0.41
EIEI  56,406  (81,3841  2.41  -0.51  7.9!  5.32
SSW,  55,133  $532  3.0!  0.3!  4.4!  1.41
Official  and  IIF  Official  and  IPF
1978-82  1993-86  1978-82  1983-96
Lor-Incem  54,283  83,012  3.8!  2.4!
Riddle  Incon  s9,389  54,999  0.7n  0.41
Oil Experters  2,377  51,798  0.5!  0.4?
Manufacturing  Exportew  54,947  5926  0.9!  0.2!
Primary  6oads  Exporters  $5,325  55,246  1.9!  i.7t
Highly Indebted  52,921  53,334  J.41  0.4!
LAC  $1,847  $3,645  0.3!  0.61
ASIA  53,335  Sl, 78  1.41 0.5t
EIEIA  54,061  5339  1.5!  0.1!
SSAF  $3,421  52,404  2.0!  1.5!
Coeercial  Creditors  Comercial  Creditors
Long-Term  (PPS4PNB)  & Short-Tere Long-Tore  (PP6SPN1)  I Short-Tore
1978-92  1983-86  1979-82  1993-96
Lo-Incone  5391  (5948)  0);2  -0.9!
M;ddle  locoel  $19,995  (J31,77)  11.72  -2.6!
Oil Exporters  56,801  J1l3,000)  1.1  -2.8a
anufacturi  g Exporters  56,619  (JlO,979)  12.1  -1.9!
Primary  goods  Exporters  $7,371  058,4471  2.6S  -2.7!
Highly Indebted  $13,905  '529,3221  :1.7  -3.97
LAC  511,:46  (525,5171  1.8:  -4.21
ASIA  55,010  (53,565)  2.02  -1.21
EIENA  52,339  51l,124)  ^ 92  -0.1
SSAF  S1,712  (1,872)  1.0!  - t.2
Craerc:al  Long-ter Credtors  Comrcial  Long-Term  Creditcrs
(PPG+PNG)  IPPG.PNS)
S9?-9-8  1993-86  1978-92  1983-86
Lou-Income  S753  (8425)  0.7!  -0.3!
Riddle  Income  814,209  (J22,527)  1.21  -1.9!





Accumulated  Value  of Flight  Capital
up through  1984
Gross  External  Estimates  of:
Country  Debt 1984  Dooley  Cuddington
Argentina  $468  $31.0  $15.8
Brazil  105.2  11.6  0.4
Chile  20.1  0.2  -2.0
Korea,  Rep.  of  43.2  9.0
Mexico  96.4  42.8  38.8
Peru  13.1  3.0  1.3
Phillipines  24.6  4.8  1.4
Venezuela  36.2  28.0  13.7
Total  69.3




Trade  volume  Indices
198X)  -1.:a:
1978  1979  1930  19031  1932  19:3  1984  1798'5  198
Ex:ports  Volume  Index
Africa  0.92  1.02  1.0  O.69  0).64  0.62  0.65  0.69  (:.  6i5
Asia  o0.69  0.94  1.0  0  .t:  1.02  1.11  1.21  1.20  1.44
India  0.67  0.92  1.00  1.02  1.02  1. 08  1.19  1.15  1.29
EMENA  0.91  0.98  1.04)  1.03  1.07  1.14  1.23  1.30  1.34
LAC  0.90  0.97  1.  00  1.05  1.05  1.10  1.21  1. 24  1.20
Low  Income  0.92  0.91  1.00  0.99  0.99  1.01  1.01  0.99  1.00
Middle  Income  0.89  0.98  1.00  0.97  0.98  1.04  1.13  1.17  1.22
Oil  Exporters  0.91  1.03  1.00  0.84  0.84  0.89  0.92  0.92  0.98
Manufacturers  0.85  0.91  1.00  1.12  1.14  1.25  1.41  1.48  1.55
Primary  0.90  0.96  1.00  0.99  1.01  1.00  1.07  1.10  1.12
HICs  0.87  0.98  1.00  0.94  0.92  0.96  1.05  1.08  1.07
Imports  Volume  Index
Africa  1.00  0.86  1.00  1.06  0.95  0.80  0.74  0.69  0.58
Asia  0.84  0.96  1.00  1.09  1.11  1.22  1.18  1.14  1.26
rndia  1.02  1.07  1.00  1.04  1.03  1.16  1.15  1.27  1.30
EMENA  0.93  0.99  1.00  1.00  0.99  1.01  1.06  1.05  1.06
LAC  0.82  0.90  1.00  1.01  0.84  0.62  0.66  0.65  0.66
Low  Income  0.85  0.87  1.00  0.93  0.90  0.86  0.86  0.87  0.81
Middle  Income  0.88  0.94  1.00  1.05  0.97  0.90  0.91  0.88  0.90
Oil  Exporters  0.90  0.88  1.00  1.14  1.01  0.83  0.80  0.78  0.71
Manufacturers  0.92  1.01  1.00  0.98  0.96  0.98  1.01  1.00  1.11
Primary  0.79  0.86  1.00  0.99  0.90  0.84  0.86  0.81  0.79
HICs  0.88  0.92  1.00  1.02  0.87  0.69  0.67  0.65  0.65
Note:  Asia  Excludes  India  and  China35
TABLE  40
Export  Voluse  Index
1979  1979  1900  1991  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
exports volindex
Turkey  1.06  0.96  1.00  1.85  2.59  2.95  3.53  3.97  3.91
Burundi  1.40  1.56  1.00  1.75  1.89  1.59  1.94  2.16  2.10
Korea  0.92  0.91  1.00  1.15  1.23  1.41  1.56  1.59  2.01
Pakistan  0.74  0.84  1.00  1.13  1.05  1.39  1.33  1.33  1.82
Thailand  0.85  0.94  1.00  1.13  1.24  1.20  1.42  1.52  1.73
Malaysia  0.82  0.97  1.00  0.99  1.10  1.23  1.40  1.41  1.66
Portugal  0.74  0.94  1.00  0.98  1.04  1.21  1.38  1.54  1.64
Mauritius  0.95  0.98  1.00  0.93  1.03  1.04  1.09  1.22  1.60
Mauritania  0.83  0.95  1.00  1.23  1.13  1.47  1.37  1.51  1.59
Mexico  0.84  0.94  1.00  1.06  1.21  1.35  1.49  1.45  1.52
Cameroon  0.67  0.80  1.00  1.22  1.17  1.40  1.56  1.65  1.51
Sri  Lanka  0.85  0.97  1.00  1.10  1.15  1.13  1.27  1.40  1.40
Bangladesh  0.98  0.97  1.00  1.15  1.24  1.29  1.30  1.19  1.40
Ecuador  0.98  1.02  1.00  1.05  1.00  1.02  1.15  1.32  1.39
Uruguay  0.91  0.97  1.00  1.06  0.95  1.10  1.10  1.16  1.33
Philippines  0.83  0.89  1.00  1.01  1.00  1.09  1.18  1.09  1.33
India  0.87  0.92  1.00  1.02  1.02  1.08  1.19  1.15  1.29
Brazil  0.75  0.82  1.00  1.21  1.10  1.26  1.54  1.64  1.29
Jordan  0.67  0.86  1.00  1.17  1.13  1.19  1.27  1.37  1.29
Papua  New  6uinea  1.01  1.00  1.00  1.05  1.04  1.05  1.05  1.22  1.29
Zaire  0.98  0.82  1.00  0.87  0.95  1.05  1.09  1.11  1.28
Hungary  0.89  0.99  1.00  1.05  1.09  1.16  1.24  1.31  1.28
Coloebia  0.87  0.87  1.00  0.90  0.92  0.81  0.91  0.99  1.25
Mali  0.72  0.80  1.00  0.95  0.95  1.05  1.12  1.19  1.24
Morocco  0.96  0.96  1.00  1.00  1.05  1.14  1.17  1.22  1.24
Chile  0.77  0.87  1.00  0.91  0.95  0.96  1.02  1.10  1.20
Egypt  0.90  0.87  1.00  0.90  0.99  1.05  1.10  1.10  1.17
Senegal  0.93  1.05  1.00  1.09  1.14  1.25  1.16  1.02  1.16
Kenya  0.99  0.95  1.00  0.96  0.95  0.97  0.99  1.05  1.15
Togo  0.99  0.68  1.00  1.27  1.25  1.07  1.09  1.10  1.15
Paraguay  0.93  1.66  1.00  1.03  1.14  0.82  0.90  1.07  1.09
Tunisia  0.82  1.00  1.00  1.03  0.96  0.97  1.00  1.03  1.09
Algeria  1.07  1.15  1.00  0.94  0.94  0.97  1.00  1S.02  1.07
Dominican  Republ  0.99  1.22  1.00  1.06  0.89  1.00  1.04  1.05  1.07
Panama  0.70  0.70  1.00  0.97  1.05  1.04  0.97  1.04  1.06
Argentina  1.00  1.01  1.00  1.11  1.05  1.02  1.07  1.20  1.06
Ivory  Coast  0.87  0.89  1.00  1.07  1.08  1.00  1.10  1.09  1.05
Venezuela  1.10  1.15  1.00  0.97  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.93  1.03
Costa  Rica  1.01  1.05  1.00  1.16  1.04  1.04  1.14  1.07  1.01
Yugoslavia  0.91  0.93  1.00  0.95  0.90  0.84  0.90  0.95  0.72
Peru  0.98  1.10  1.10  0.97  1.03  0.93  1.01  1.05  0.91
Benin  0.66  0.90  1.00  1.09  1.30  1.04  1.07  1.04  0.91
Ethiopia  0.86  0.85  1.00  0.99  0.95  1.03  1.20  0.96  0.90
Malawi  0.68  0.75  1.00  0.82  0.74  0.76  1.00  0-96  0.89
Jamaica  0.99  1.02  1.00  1.04  1.02  0.98  1.00  0.85  0.89
Indonesia  0.93  0.95  1.00  0.82  0.75  0.78  0.79  0.72  0.8336
TABLE  48  (con't.)
1979  1979  1980  1991  1982  1983  1984  1985  1996
Central  Afr. Rep  0.81  0.83  1.00  1.04  0.83  0.85  0.86  0.89  0.78
Sierra  Leone  0.99  0.75  1.00  0.95  0.81  0.65  0.69  0.72  0.76
Zambia  1.16  1.03  1.00  0.87  1.01  0.91  0.85  0.80  0.74
6uyana  1.08  0.97  1.00  0.94  0.72  0.67  0.75  0.77  0.72
Rwanda  0.79  1.07  1.00  1.01  1.03  0.79  0.65  0.77  0.71
Tanzania  0.97  0.99  1.00  1.19  0.97  0.79  0.68  0.76  0.69
Madagascar  0.94  1.02  1.00  0.74  0.68  0.60  0.63  0.66  0.68
El Salvador  0.86  1.17  1.00  0.85  0.75  0.83  0.79  0.82  0.67
Guinea  Bissau  0.81  0.81  1.00  0.72  0.64  0.59  0.81  0.59  0.65
Sudan  0.73  0.59  1.00  0.85  0.61  0.79  1.12  0.58  0.63
Niger  1.23  0.94  1.00  0.98  0.76  0.80  0.73  0.66  0.63
6uatemala  0.86  0.95  1.00  0.86  0.78  0.70  0.69  0.70  0.60
Haiti  0.54  0.60  1.00  0.58  0.71  0.64  0.69  0.64  0.58
Nigeria  0.74  1.10  1.00  0.45  0.36  0.34  0.35  0.43  0.42
Burkina  Faso  0.98  0.95  1.00  1.13  0.95  0.85  0.89  0.93
Burma  0.59  0.90  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.11
Honduras  0.89  1.05  1.00  1.01  0.90  0.96  0.99  1.05
Ghana  1.18  1.16  1.00  0.91  1.05  0.57  0.62  0.66
Somalia  1.07  0.90  1.00  0.90  1.20  0.97  0.55  0.76
Chad  1.18  1.11  1.00  0.90  0.88  0.77  0.73  0.76
6uinea  0.87  0.89  1.00  0.92  0.99  1.01  1.12  1.0637
TABLE  4C
Imports  Voluse  Index
1978  197n  1980  1991  1992  1983  1964  1983  1986
isports  volindex
Turkey  1.05  0.98  1.00  1.15  1.24  1.45  1.85  2.00  2.23
Ethiopia  0.80  0.85  1.00  1.07  1.19  1.25  1.37  1.36  1.33
Korea  0.95  1.06  1.00  1.04  1.07  1.18  t.30  1.28  1.
Rwanda  0.80  0.85  1.00  0.98  1.20  1.19  1.31  1.19  1.
Buinea  Bissau  1.02  1.04  1.00  0.93  1.29  1.24  1.44  1.49  1.
Jordan  0.80  1.06  1.00  1.19  1.27  1.31  1.30  1.32  1.
Nauritius  1.10  1.10  1.00  0.89  0.80  0.82  0.90  0.99  1.
Mauritania  1.06  0.99  1.00  1.23  1.47  1.43  1.35  1.36  1.
Ind!a  1.02  1.07  1.00  1.04  1.03  1.16  1.15  1.27  1.
Sri  Lanka  0.71  0.84  g.l0  0.93  1.07  1.11  1.12  1.25  1.
Mali  0.85  M.91  1.00  0.96  0.95  1.08  1.17  1.35  S.
Indonesia  0.82  0.91  1.00  1.34  1.36  1.43  1.1!  1.14  :.
Nalaysia  0.69  0.83  1.00  1.06  1.20  1.31  1.39  1.26  1.
Burundi  0.98  1.16  1.0O  0.94  1.16  1.27  1.37  1.22  *.
Portugal  0.81  0.90  I.Q0  1.06  1.12  1.02  0.99  1.01
Thailand  0.84  1.01  1.00  1.00  0.85  1.08  1.11  1.07  1.
PaMistan  0.74  0.96  1.00  0.92  0.80  0.91  0.98  1.03  1.
Hungary  1.06  1.01  1.0C  1.02  0.98  0.99  1.00  1.07
Togo  1.32  1.12  1.00  1.15  1.10  0.87  0.95  0.93  1.
Paraguay  9.63  0.68  1.00  0.99  0.93  0.64  0.76  0.76  :.07
Bangladesh  0.77  0.75  1.00  0.96  0.94  0.92  1.02  1.21  1.05
;orocco  15.07  1.11  1.00  1.02  1.05  0.93  0.97  0.97  1.04
Coloebia  0.85  0.84  1.00  1.08  1.26  1.14  1.11  1.08  1.03
Senegal  0.93  0.93  1.00  1.15  1.!0  1.14  1.04  0.97  1.02
Tunisia  0.83  0.96  1.00  1.13  1.14  1.11  1.19  1.02  1.00
Ca  roon  0.81  0.90  1.00  1.15  1.04  0.99  1.08  0.75  I. 
Tanzania  0.73  0.59  1.00  0.9t  0.79  0.61  0.68  P.  7  O.97
Panama  0.83  0.85  1.00  1.00  1.0C  0.91  0.98  0.99  0X95
Papua  Mew  8uine  0.85  0.91  1.00  1.00  0.9?  0.98  0.97  0.93  0.9;
'amaica  1.09  1.00  1.00  1.06  !.09  1.03  0.98  0.90  e.9;
Costa  Rica  1.01  1.04  1.00  0.76  0.60  0.70  0.78  0.84  X.9:
Philippines  0.83  0.97  1.00  0.97  1.0  1.12  0.94  0.72  0.90
Central  Afr.  Re  0.84  0.79  1.00  0.86  0.B1  0.79  0.82  0.85  0.88
Algeria  1.05  0.97  1.00  1.11  1.12  1.12  1.14  1.07  0.24
El  Salvador  1.39  1.30  1.00  0.89  0.77  0.76  0.91  0.83  0.89
Niger  0.84  0.94  1.00  1.03  1.05  1.01  0.95  0.98  0. S
Dominican  Repub  0.72  0.85  1.00  0.90  0.77  0.75  0.69  0.71  . 7?
Ecuador  0.91  0.92  1.00  0.91  0.97  0.73  0.71  0.76  07
Egypt  0.76  0.98  1.00  0.87  0.89  1.01  1.04  0.91  0.76
Uruguay.  0.76  0.93  1.00  1.01  0.87  0.70  0.59  0.60  0.  C
Zaire  0.78  0.79  1.00  0.89  0.80  0.76  0.73  0.74  0.'4
Sudan  r  0.78  0.64  1.00  1.18  1.29  1.13  1.22  0.82  G.72
Venezuela  1.24  1.07  1.00  1.01  1.09  0.55  0.68  0.71  O.,
Yugoslavia  0.98  1.10  1.00  0.97  0.75  0.69  0.68  0.68  0').7
Chile  0.69  0.84  1.00  1.16  0.74  0.63  0.73  0.65  0.2!
Kenya  1.12  0.91  1.00  0.79  0.66  0.54  0.64  0.bq  M.7037
TABLE  4C
Imports  Voluwu  Index
1978  1979  1990  1991  1982  1983  1984  1985  19
imports  volindex
Turkey  1.05  0.98  1.00  1.15  1.24  1.45  1.85  2.00  2.
Ethiopia  0.88  0.85  1.00  1.07  1.19  1.25  1.37  1.36  I.
Korea  0.95  1.06  1.00  1.04  1.07  1.18  1.30  1.28  1.
Ruanda  0.80  0.85  1.00  0.98  1.20  1.19  1.31  1.19  1.
6uinea  Bissau  1.02  1.04  1.00  0.93  1.29  1.24  1.44  1.48  1.
Jordan  0.80  1.06  1.00  1.19  1.27  1.31  1.30  1.32  1.39
Nauritius  1.10  1.10  1.00  0.89  0.80  0.82  0.90  0.99  1.8
Mauritania  1.06  0.99  1.00  1.23  1.47  1.43  1.35  1.36  1.33
India  1.02  1.07  1.00  1.04  1.03  1.16  1.15  1.27  1.30
Sri  Lanka  0.71  0.84  l.J0  0.9,3  1.07  1.11  1.12  1.25  1.29
Mali  0.85  0.91  1.00  0.96  0.95  1.08  1.17  1.35  1.29
Indonesia  0.82  0.91  1.00  1.  4  1.36  1.43  1.11  1.14  1  .6
Nalaysia  0.69  0.83  1.00  1.06  1.20  1.31  1.39  1.26  1.^^
Burundi  0.98  1.16  .00  0.94  1.16  1.27  1.37  1.22  .:2
Portugal  0.81  0.90  1.Q0  1.06  1.12  1.02  0.98  1.01  .1
Thailand  0.84  1.01  1.00  1.00  0.85  1.03  1.11  1.07
Pakistan  0.74  0.96  1.00  0.32  0.80  0.91  0.98  1.03  1.12
Hungary  1.06  1.01  I.OC  1.02  0.98  0.99  1.00  1.07  ;10
Togao  1.32  1.12  1.00  1.15  1.10  0.87  0.95  0.93  1.09
Paraguay  0.63  0.68  1.00  0.99  0.93  0.64  0.76  0.76  -.07
Bangladesh  0.77  0.75  1.00  0.96  0.94  0.92  1.02  1.21  1.05
oarocco  1.07  1.11  1.00  1.02  1.05  0.93  0.97  0.97  1.04
Colombia  0.95  0.84  1.00  :.08  1.26  1.14  1.11  1.08  1.0
Senegal  0.93  0.93  1.00  1.15  1.!0  1.14  1.04  0.97  1.0^
Tunisia  0.83  0.96  1.00  1.13  1.14  1.11  1.18  1.02  1.00
Cameroon  0.81  0.90  1.00  1.15  1.04  0.99  1.08  0.75  1.JC
Tanzania  0.73  0.59  1.00  0.93  0.79  0.61  0.68  0.77  0.97
Panama  0.83  0.85  1.00  1.00  1.0C  0.91  0.98  0.99  .9
Papua  Nev  8uine  0.85  0.91  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.98  0.97  0.93  0.93
aaaica  1.09  1.00  1.00  1.06  1.08  1.03  0.98  0.90  MI,
Costa  Rica  1.01  1.04  1.00  0.76  0.60  0.70  0.78  0.84  J.9.
Philippines  0.83  0.97  1.00  0.97  1.01  1.12  0.94  0.72  0.90
Central  Afr.  Re  0.84  0.79  1.00  0.86  0.01  0.79  0.82  0.95  0.8e
Algeria  1.05  0.97  1.00  1.11  1.12  1.12  1.14  1.07  0.24
El  Salvador  1.39  1.30  1.00  0.89  0.77  0.76  0.81  ).%3  .83
Niger  0.84  0.94  1.00  1.03  1.05  1.01  0.85  0.98  0.'^
Dominican  Repub  0.72  0.85  1.00  0.90  0.77  0.75  0.69  0.71  0.7
Ecuador  0.91  0.91  1.00  0.91  0.97  0.73  0.71  0.76  0.
Egypt  0.76  0.98  1.00  0.87  0.88  1.01  1.04  0.91  3.76
Uruguay  0.76  O.q9  1.00  1.01  0.87  9.70  0.59  0.60  O. 
Zaire  0.78  0.79  1.00  0.89  0.90  0.76  0.73  0.74  02.4
Sudan  0.78  0.64  1.00  1.18  1.29  1.13  1.22  0.82  0.72
Venezuela  1.24  1.07  1.00  1.01  1.09  0.55  0.68  0.71  C.
Yugoslavia  0.98  1.10  1.00  0.87  0.75  0.69  0.68  0.68  C.?
Chile  0.69  0.94  1.00  1.16  0.74  0.63  0.73  0.65  C.
Kenya  1.12  0.91  1.00  0.79  0.66  0.54  0.64  0.60  0.739
TABLE 5
MOULD  INTEREST  RATES  AND  PRICES
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1994  1985  1986
LIBOR  6  o.  9.22  12.2S  14.0!  16.7%  13.6U  9.9?  11.3!  8.61  6.92
Inflation Nanufacturing  Uiit Value  5.7n  12.3N  9.n9  1.02  -2.01  -2.0!  -2.11  1.1  17.7!
LIN real Ianufacturing  Unit Value  -6.5$  -0.2!  4.1!  15.7J  15.61 12.01  13.41  7.62  -10.92
Inflatice US  7.42  8.83  9.12  9.61  6.5!  3.X9  4.11  3.3!  2.61
LIBOR  real  US  1.82  3.42  4.91  7.1!  7.1!  6.1!  7.22  5.3!  4.32
Inflatio  Trade  Pricn  1l.3!  17.3?  17.6!  -3.1! -4.5!  -4.1  -2.6?  -1.0  9.12
LIBOR  real  Trade  Prices  -2.1?  -5.2!  -3.52  19.8!  18.1T  14.01  13.92  9.7n  -2.3Z
Srces: INF, IFS.40
TABLE  6A
Gains  of Debtors  with  Counteriactual  Interest  Ratn
(four  percent  above  inflation of  mufacturing  unit value)
19SB  1956  1996
Interest Rate  Interest  Rate
CF  Networth  gatn  is million)  CFI  Netnorth  gain
Africa  $835  1  1,503  Africa  15,079
Asia  55,608 516,796  Asia  121,477
India  $177  $5B9  Indta  $797
EIENA  15,613  $15,235  ENENA  $10,493
LAC  $36,951 592,799  LAC  iS9,686
Los Incoe  (1$1,673)  ($3,056)  Lou  Income  i217
Niddle  Intcoe  $50,083  *12S,359  liddle Incom  5136,517
Non  Oil Exporting  $20,924 $71,395  Non  Oil Exporting  $74,591
Oil Exporters  821,159 $59,004  Oil Erporters  $61,926
Kanufacturers  $19,932 145,&fl  Ianufacturers  845,390
Prieary  17,320 822,706  Primary  $29,420
HICa  540,957  $103,379  HICs  8113,40
SAL  Countr  ns  840,976  $105,551  SIIL  Ceuntries  $110,192
Non  SAL  Countries  87,534 $20,782  Non  SAL  Countrin  $26,542
CF  Netuorth  gain  SOPhire (share  of GDP)  CFBI  lNtvorth  gain  lDhhare
Africa  0.2.  1.21  Africa  3.91
Asia  1.92  5.51  Asia  7.01
India  0.11  0.32  India  0.31
EDEIU  1.92  4.52  EllEA  3.12
LAC  5.22  14.11  LAC  15.22
Lon  Income  -1.4%  -2.42  Low  Incomo  0.21
Niddle Incom  3.7  9.91  Niddle  Income  10.5t
Non  Oil  Exporting  3.42  9.1t  Non  Oil Exporting  9.42
oil  Exportrs  4.12  13.91  Oil Exporters  14.n
lInufacturers  3.11  6.n  Manufacturers  6.61
Primary  2.42  7.02  Primry  9.11
RICS  4.62  13.02  HICt  14.32
SAL  Countries  3.42  9.32  SAL  Countries  9.n
mon  SAL  Countrin  2.n  6.92  Ion  SAL  Coontries  9.92
CF  Nteorth gain  DdtShare  (slhe  of ddtl  CFBI  Netortwh  gain  kbtShare
Africa  0.62  1.62  Africa  5.62
Asia  4.52  9.5  Asia  12.12
India  0.72  1.41  India  1.92
EaEIU  4.3  9.62  ElE  5.92
LAC  11.41 23.92  LIC  25.5t
Lou  Intom  -2.92 -3.62  Lou  lacen  0.3
Kiddle  Income  8.62  17.22  Kiddle  Incom  111.12
lon  Oil Exporting  7.72  14.5  Non  Oil Exporting  15.21
Oil Experters  10.22  22.21  Oil Exporters  23.72
Kanufacturers  7.71  13.42  Ianufcturers  13.32
Primay  4.22  9.72  Primary  12.51
HICS  10.62 21.19  HIC,  23.91
SAL  Countries  6.12  15.92  SAL  Coumtrin  .62
No Sk Costrin  5.62  12.1t  Nbn  SM  Countrin  15.41
(cotsterfactual  since  I1971  lsince  IS11I
lotex kia  Ecludsn  India  and  China41
TAOLE  68
Increase  of  Netmorth  (reduction  of  Debt)  From  A  Constant
Real  Interest  Rate  of  Four  Percent:  Share  of  ODP
1982  1986  1986
Counterfactual  since  1978  Counterfactual  since  1981
Interest  Rate  Interest  Rate
CF  Networth  gi:i  GDPshare  CF8I  Networth  gain  6DPshare
Chile  8.32  37.01  Chile  36.12
Ecuador  8.7Z  27.02  Ecuador  27.7?
Mexico  7.6?  26.2?  Nexico  25.82
Panaua  12.02  25.5  Panaua  26.5Z
Venezuela  6.32  24.0?  Venezuela  25.0?
Costa  Rica  -1.02  21.41  Costa  Rica  23.4?
Jamaica  1.42  13.92  Jamaica  17.2%
Argentina  5.7?  13.3?  Argentina  14.62
Ivory  Coast  4.8?  1228Z  Ivory  Coast  17.51
Dominican  Republic  4.21  12.71  Dominican  Republic  12.0?
Uruguay  2.4?  12.32  Uruguay  12.9?
Papua  Nec  Guinea  3.3?  !2.2?  Papua  New  6uinea  15.32
Portugal  5.2%  11.5'  Portugal  13.82
Yugoslavia  4.0?  9.3Z  Yugoslavia  11.1?
Niger  5.1?  p.2Z  Niger  :1.32
Nigeria  2.0?  8.1%  Nigeria  7.82
lauritius  5.42  8.1?  Mauritius  8.1%
Horocco  4.5?  7.9?  Morocco  10.1I
Brazil  38.9  7.3?  Brazil  9.42
Colaobia  2.9?  7.7X  Colombia  11
Korea  4.11  7.71  Korea  8.6?
Malawi  3.6?  6.8%  Malami  7.98
El  Salvador  3.3?  6.8?  El  Salvador  8.8?
Malaysia  1.4?  6.2?  1'alaysia  8.M2
Thailand  3.1%  5.72  Thailand  5.82
Guatemala  2.98  5.52  5uateuala  7.52
Sri  Lanka  2.4?  5.4%  Sri  Lanka  5.42
Indonesia  1.1  4.7?  Indonesia  6.42
Honduras  5.0%  4.5%  Honduras  4.11
Philippines  -'.2?  3.0:  Philippines  8.5?
Algeria  -0.2?  2.9?  Algeria  6.62
Turkey  0.0?  2.4?  Turkey  6.7%
Tunisia  0.7Z  1.9Z  Tunisia  4.12
Hungarv  3.0?  1.8Z  Hungary  -49.62
Kenya  0.0?  1.5%  Kenya  4.9%
Burkina  Faso  1.9Z  1.32  Burkina  Fasc  1.5?
Pakistan  0.6?  1.1'  Pakistan  1.2
Egypt  0.%  19.1%  Egypt  1.7l
Caeeroon  0.30  0.9%  Cameroon  2.2?
Paraguay  0.3?  0.3Z  Paraguay  0.9?
India  0.  1  0.32  India  0.'?
Burma  0.1?  0.2%  Burma  0.62
Bangladesh  -0.1%  0.0Z  Bangladesh  0.  2
Ethiopia  0.0?  -0.1?  Ethiopia  0.2?42 
TABLE  6B  (Ckn't.)
1982  1986  1986
Jordan  0.5Z  -0.1  Jordan  0.01
Burundi  -0.2X  -0.32  Burundi  0.0O
Rwanda  -0.6Z  -0.9X  Rwanda  -0.32
Madagascar  0.22  -1.02  Madagascar  -1.92
Senegal  -1.3Z  -1.52  Senegal  0  22
Haiti  0.0  -1.72  Haiti  -1.72
Peru  2.4Z  -1.92  Peru  1.52
Mali  -1.42  -3.02  Mali  -1.82
6hana  -3.02  -4.02  Ghana  -1.22
Central  Afr.  Rep  -3.52  -4.72  Central  Afr.  Rep  -1.52
Chad  -4.8%  -5.92  Chad  -2.1%
Siarra  Leone  -2.11  -6.5%  Sierra  Leone  -3.52
6uyana  -1.52  -7.22  Suyana  4.62
Suinea  -4.32  -10.22  Guinea  -4.92
Benin  -5.1%  -10.92  Benin  -7.12
Sudan  -5.92  -12.42  Sudan  -4.82
Tanzania  -3.1%  -13.52  Tanzania  -9.82
Mauritania  -8.3%  -15.0%  .1auritania  -5.89
Zaire  -8.27  -15.32  Zaire  1.62
Zambia  -3.2%  -21.12  Zambia  -5.02
Guinea  Bissau  -3.22  -21.72  Suinea  Bissau  -18.12
Togao  -21.22  -23.8X  Togo  -0.9243
TABLE  6C
Gains  of  Net  Vorth (Reduction  of Debts  From  A  Constant
Real  Interest Rate  of Four  Percent:  Ratio  To  Debt
1982  1986  1996
Counterfactual  since  1978  Counterfactual  since  1901
Interest  Rate  Interest  Rate
CF  Networth  gain  DebtShare  CF8I  Networth  gain  DebtShare
Venezuela  13.32  35.5%  Venezuela  '6.92
Ecuador  13.72  33.32  Ecuador  34.22
Mexico  14.8Z  32.3%  Mexico  31.92
Chile  11.62  29.8Z  Chile  29.02
Yugoslavia  13.02  29.0X  Yugoslavia  33.4%
Panaua  13.1%  26.72  Panama  27.98
Argentina  7.41  21.3%  Argentina  23&4%
Uruguay  8.3X  20.62  Uruguay  21.7l
Costa  Rica  -0.82  20.3X  Costa  Rica  22.3%
Dominican  Republic  11.62  20.2%  Dominican  Republic  19.11
Portugal  8.9Z  19.9%  Portugal  23.9%
Brazil  11.21  18.72  Brazil  22.5Z
Nigeria  14.52  17.3%  Nigeria  :6.5%
Mauritius  10.1%  16.6b  Mauritius  16.7%
Colombia  11.12  16.62  Colombia  17.52
Korea  7.81  16.52  Korea  18.42
El Salvador  8.1%  15.9X  El Salvador  20.6%
Guatemala  15.67  14.82  Guatemala  20.5%
Papua  New  Guinea  4.8%  13.32  Papua  NeN  Guinea  16.82
Niger  10.52  13.12  Niger  16.1Z
Thailand  9.3-  12.83  Thailand  13.12
Ivory  Coast  4.6%  10.92  Ivory  Coast  14.82
Algeria  -0.41  10.2X  tigeria  23.2%
Sri  Lanka  4.02  8.6Z  Sri Lanka  8.5%
Jamaica  1.5%  8.5%  Jamaica  :.4X
Indonesia  4.0Q  8.22  :ndonesia  11.12
Malaysia  2.72  7.'Z  Malaysia  10.3X
Malawi  4.2%  7.5%  Xalawi  8.5%
Morocco  5.9%  6.4%  -rocco  9.2%
Honduras  7.7%  5.5%  Honduras  5.0%
Turkey  0.1%  4.22  Turkey  :1.9X
Phil.ppines  -0.32  3.2:  Philippines  9.1%
Pakistan  2.92  '.7%  Pakistan  2.82
Tunisia  1.5%  2.-7  Tunisia  5.92
Cameroon  0.92  2.6%  Caseroon  6.2%
Burkina  Faso  !.,Z  '.62  Burkina  Faso  3.1Z
Hungary  7.7%  2.4Z  Hungary  -68.02
Kenya  0.0%  2.22  Kenya  7.22
India  0.'7  1.4t  India  1.92
Egypt  :.1%  1.42  Egypt  '.1:
Paraguay  1.22  0.5:  Paraguay  .7
Burma  0.42  0.4:  Burma  1.42
Bangladesh  -0.32  0.1%  Bangladesh  0.52
Jordan  0.32  -0.1:  Jordan  0.0244
TABLE  6C  (con't.)
1982  1986  1986
Ethiopia  0.0  -0.2l  Ethiopia  0.5%
Burundi  -1.1  -0.7?  Burundi  0.01
Madagascar  0.2Z  -1.0  Madagascar  -1.7Z
Senegal  -2.11  -1.92  Senegal  0.3%
Mali  -2.01  -2.7%  Mali  -1.6%
Peru  5.01  -3.2X  Peru  2.4Z
Guyana  -0.8%  -3.32  Guyana  2.1%
Soealia  -1.0%  -3.3Z  Somalia  -2.6X
Ruanda  -4.1Z  -3.9%  Rwanda  -1.42
Haiti  0.1%  -5.3X  Haiti  -5.12
Zambia  -3.4%  -7.0%  Zambia  -1.7Z
Mauritania  -5.4%  -7.1  Mauritania  -2.8Z
6hana  -9.0%  -9.41  Ghana  -2.8X
Central  fr.  Pep  -10.9%  -10.0%  Central  Afr.  Rep  -3.1l
Sudan  -7.1%  -11.01  Sudan  -4.3t
Guinea  -5.7Z  -11.1%  Guinea  -5.3Z
Guinea  Bissau  -3.31  -11.8%  Guinea  Bissau  -9.9%
Sierra  Leone  -5.5Z  -13.5%  Sierra  Leone  -7.3Z
Zaire  -15.7%  -14.1l  Zaire  1.5%
Tanzania  -6.6%  -15.4X  Tanzania  -10.0%
Benin  -e.1  -17.0X  Benin  -11.1%
Togao  -19.0  -22.51  Togo  -0.8l
Chad  -17.7%  -25.6%  Chad  -9.2Z45
Table  7
Actual  Terms  of  Trade  With  Average  of  1969  to  1978  As  Base  Line:  1.00
1970  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
s of  Trade
tual  over  1969  to  1978
Manufacturing  Exporters
ordan  1.05  1.02  0.97  0.92  0.99  0.99  1.03  1.02  1.17
Yugoslavia  1.01  0.99  0.99  0.98  1.01  0.99  0.94  0.92  1.02
hilippines  0.98  0.95  0.87  0.84  0.80  0.86  0.88  0.86  1.02
Morocco  0.90  0.97  0.92  0.87  0.84  0.86  0.85  0.86  0.95
Korea  1.02  1.00  0.88  0.86  0.88  0.88  0.90  0.89  0.95
Tunisia  0.98  1.OB  1.12  1.15  1.17  1.17  1.'1  1.06  0.95
Portugal  1.00  1.00  0.96  0.91  0.89  0.E9  0.88  0.88  0.94
Thailand  0.91  0.93  0.89  0.81  0.75  0.80  0.79  0.75  0.8:
Hungary  0.91  0.89  0.89  0.f8  0.86  0.84  0.82  0.82  0.78
Uruguay  0.78'  0.79  0.76  0.?8  0.79  0.71  0.68  0.65  0.75
ndia  1.00  0.90  0.65  0.69  0.70  0.79  0.72  0.73  0.75
Brazil  1.0  0.99  0.75  0.65  0.65  0.61  0.69  0.65  0.72
Turkey  0.84  0.83  0.64  0.59  0.56  0.55  0.62  0.63  %,70
Pakistan  0.96  1.04  1.00  0.74  0.66  0.66  0.70  0.69  0.6t
Primary  Exporters
Niger  1.03  1.44  1.18  1.32  1.72  1.98  1.92  1.84  1.88
Rwanda  1.00  1.16  0.87  0.70  0.80  1.20  1.80  1.19  1.84
Tanzania  0.99  0.85  1.36  1.25  '.24  1.23  1.28  1.17
Costa  Rica  1.09  1.01  1.01  0.83  0.86  0.93  0.96  1.05  1.':
Ethiopia  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.82  0.95  1.28
Sudan  1.08  1.13  1.01  1.14  1.38  1.31  1.24  1.61  1.'9
Guinea  Bissau  0.83  0.78  0.53  1.13  1.06  1.08  1.29  1.31  I.:S
Dominican  Republic  0.79  0.81  1.01  I.06  0.91  0.96  0.97  0.92  1.10
Sri  Lanka  1.26  1.10  1.01  0.95  0.94  1.0'  1.26  1.06  1.07
Mauritania  0.95  0.84  0.80  0.88  0.90  0.85  0.90  1.02  !06
Uamaira  1.12  0.95  0.96  0.83  0.81  0.78  0.87  0.90  1.0'
Ivory  Coast  1.29  1.1  1.00  0.87  0.85  0.86  0.99  0.97  1.!
Senegal  1.05  0.99  0.94  1.02  0.99  0.97  1.02  1.00  1.0:
Central  Afr.  Rep  1.08  0.98  0.94  0.90  0.93  0.92  0.96  0.93  l.0(
Colombia  1.18  1.17  1.07  0.94  0.96  0.97  1.03  1.05  ^.99
Paraguay  1.19  0.65  1.13  1.02  0.96  1.09  1.09  0.94  0.98
Haiti  1.14  0.95  0.98  0.95  0.86  0.9t  0.99  0.90  3.93
lalaysia  1.09  1.17  1.21  1.10  1.08  1.11  1.'9  1.14  A.;6
Mali  0.93  0.93  0.93  0.93  0.94  1.02  1.14  1.04  Q.;:
Togo  0.99  1.!1  0.94  0.90  0.91  0.91  0.95  0.95  0.91
Panama  0.93  0.89  0.82  0.81  0.77  0.78  0.85  0.86  0.83
El Salvador  1.07  0.96  0.89  0.74  0.7'  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.;'
Guyana  0.92  0.85  0.91  0.83  0.79  0.74  0.71  0.72  O.S:
Gua'eeala  0.98  0.87  0.81  0.74  0.70  0.71  0.75  0.68  0^.8:
4adagas:ar  0.81  0.70  0.66  0.65  0.72  0.78  0.94  0.75  0.29
Burundi  0.91  0.06  0.88  0.53  0.55  0.68  0.72  0.66  0.7'
Bangladesh  0.69  0.67  0.76  0.66  0.53  0.59  0.69  0.95  0.72
Papua  New  Buinea  0.90  1.05  0.94  0.72  0.67  0.73  0.79  0.72  0.70
Kenya  0.99  0.91  0.84  Q.71  0.68  0.64  0.72  0.64  0.'046
TABLE  7  (con't.)
1979  1979  1980  1981  1982  1984  1985  1986
Peru  0.86  1.19  1.16  1.01  0.90  0.99  0.95  0.76  0.64
enin  0.95  0.95  0.84  0.72  0.11  0.71  0.70  0.70  0.61
Chile  0.65  0.72  0.71  0.65  0.59  0.62  0.57  0.53  0.57
Argentina  0.62  0.68  0.78  0.84  0.64  0.63  0.69  0.61  0.56
Nalawi  0.97  0.71  0.72  0.85  0.86  0.79  0.79  0.53  0.54
Zaire  0.77  0.95  0.89  0.73  0.63  0.61  0.66  0.65  0.54
Zaebia  0.52  0.73  0.63  0.46  0.34  0.40  0.49  0.55  0.44
Sierra  Leone  1.15  1.59  1.10  1.10  0.79  0.62  0.44  0.40  0.37
Burkina  Faso  0.79  0.84  0.87  0.85  0.97  0.9J  1.01  0.86
Burma  0.99  1.04  1.11  1.15  0.90  0.96
Chad  0.85  0.81  0.74  0.76  0.70  0.85  0.89  0.89
Ghana  1.13  1.13  1.31  1.20  0.81  0.79  1.10  1.10
Guinea  1.24  1.19  1.17  1.41  1.29  1.27  1.38  1.42
Honduras  1.24  1.11  1.13  1.01  0.91  0.84  0.83  0.95
Somalia  1.35  1.41  1.39  1.40  1.23  1.21  1.22  1.21
Oil  Exporters
Indonesia  1.29  1.63  2.11  2.46  2.39  2.27  2.26  2.23  2.00
Venezuela  1.37  1.87  2.49  2.39  1.85  1.61  1.98  1.84  1.36
Algeria  1.11  1.41  2.00  2.35  2.27  2.22  2.22  2.16  1.21
Nigeria  1.37  1.08  1.40  2.53  2.19  2.03  2.29  1.9  0.89
Ecuador  0.99  1.20  1.32  1.21  1.17  1.15  1.10  1.02  0.75
Mexico  1.01  1.11  1.42  1.52  1.49  1.04  1.00  0.93  0.70
Egypt  0.86  1.09  1.20  1.09  1.08  1.05  1.03  0.89  0.66
Cameroon  0.92  0.76  0.80  0.78  0.80  0.76  0.83  0.81  0.6647
Table  Ba
lIprovements in Resource Balance  (as  2 of  GDP)
With 1969  to 1978 Average  Terms  of  Trade
1978  1979  180  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1926
Resource ga1 CFI gain
6DP  Share
Oil Exporters  -2.91  -5.4%  -9.6%  -9.8%  -8.71  -7.2%  -7.2%  -5.72  -0.4%
Manufacturers  0.5%  0.92  3.0%  4.2%  4.1%  4.8%  4.72  5.3l  .SX
Prisary  -0.7%  -0.1%  1.5%  2.3%  2.0%  1.52  ).0.  0.3%
Lao  Income  1.0%  0.5%  1.1%  3.0%  3.9%  4.82  2.3%  2.  22  2.:.
Middle  Income  -1.0%  -1.52  -2.1%  -1.8%  -1.2%  -0.72  -1.02  00%  :.n2
Non  Oil Exporting  0.0%  0.6%  2.77.  3.7%  3.4X.  3.4%  3.1%  3.32  3.4',
Africa  -2.6%  -0.1%  -2.8%  -4.9%  -2.32  -0.3%  -3.3%  -2.5%  l2
Asia  -1.6%  -7.6%  -4.4  -3.2%  -2.2%  -2.5%  -3.0%  -2.12  -1.52
India  0.0%  1.02  3.5%  3.0%  2.6%  1.81  2.5%  2.4%  2.1
ENENA  1.2%  -0.5%  -0.6%  0.47  0.8%  1.3%  1.7%  2.3%  3T'.
LAC  -0.9%  -1.1%  -1.11  -0.7%  -0.5%  0.32  0.0%  1.0%  3. 1
HICS  -1.4%  -1.1  -1.5%  -1.50  -0.4%  -0.8%  0.Z  .
SAL  Countries  -0.6%  -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.4%  0.0%  0.8%  9.42  1.12. 
Non SAL  Countr:es  -1.b6  -6.2%  -8.6%  -6.5%  -4.3%  -4.02  - .12  -3.6X
.dote: Asia excludes  .ndia and China48
TABLE  83
laprovunnts in Resource  alance (as  2 of 6DPI
Kith 1969  to 1978  Average  Terns  of Trade
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1914  1995  1986
Resource  Bal  CFI  gain
60P  Share
Manufuturing  Exporters
Hungary  42  5S  52  52  72  92  112  12Z  132
Uruguay  52  42  5l  42  42  9X  92  11Z  10X
Turkey  12  it  52  72  92  1O0  102  10X  8l
Thailand  22  22  32  61  62  52  62  72  72
Pakistan  1I  -12  1  6%  92  81  72  72  6X
Bratil  02  12  3l  42  41  42  42  52  42
Korea  -12  0  5X  62  51  S  42  42  32
Philippines  22  12  32  42  42  32  32  32  32
Portugal  0  02  32  52  42  42  a2  52  2l
India  02  12  42  32  32  22  32  22  22
Tunisia  12  -32  -32  -5  -62  -72  -52  -32  02
Foroco  22  12  32  52  52  42  52  42  02
Yugoslavia  02  12  12  12  02  02  12  12  -1t
Jordan  -52  -92  22  102  52  -1Z  -22  -52  -252
Prisary Exporters
Zambia  292  122  192  262  352  292  262  241  482
Zaire  42  12  32  7X  102  142  172  192  282
Chile  112  92  92  92  122  13S  172  232  27X
Papua  Nel  Guinea  5S  -22  32  162  192  152  122  172  19Z
Malawi  22  13!  112  52  42  62  62  16X  15t
Kenya  12  32  72  10X  102  0OX  8X  112  101
Guyana  52  1I1  72  152  142  162  192  192  "O
Sierra Leone  -22  -82  12  22  62  52  72  6X  C2
Benin  32  52  52  010  92  102  102  102  9
Panama  32  52  102  107  122  112  62  62
Paraguay  -32  92  O0  12  22  1Z  2'  72  A
Peru  32  -42  -32  02  12  02  12  42
Malaysia  -42  -82  -102  -42  -32  -52  -82  -72
El  Salvador  -32  22  41  92  82  112  112  142  42
Burundi  12  22  42  92  11X  77  62  7Z  42
Nadagascar  52  102  112  92  62  42  32  2;
Guatemala  12  32  52  62  62  42  4%  52  IX
Colombia  -32  -2l  -12  10  02  -12  2.
Haiti  -42  O0  -32  12  4  32  34  3'
Central Afr. Rep  -22  12  3X  22  2  22  07o  32
Ivory Coast  -82  -42  12  52  62  62  1  1X  -
Guinea  -5X  -4l  -42  -92  -72  -62  -82  -92
Bangladesh  02  12  -12  22  52  42  12  -32
Jamaica  -5X  2X  22  10  112  127  82  72  %
Argentina  -62  02  62  12  -32  -42  -42  -7X  -2:
Togo  -62  -62  02  12  02  1  12  -2  -:249
TABLE  83 (con't.)
1978  1979  1980  1991  1982  1983  1984  1915  1986
Senegal  -5X  -12  -12  -62  -52  -42  -52  -42  -42
"Ali  21  31  32  -12  -22  -62  -102  -102  -42
Sudan  -12  -22  -22  -52  -112  -8l  -72  -82  -4%
Dominican  Republic  42  52  -3X  -22  12  2X  42  32  -42
Rwanda  22  -22  42  5%  42  -I1  -52  02  -6,
Ethiopia  It  1  12  02  02  02  21  -12  -7X
Mauritania  -3X  42  92  42  02  52  2%  -52  -71
Costa  Rica  -42  -22  O0  91  7%  32  12  -21  -102
Sri Lanka  -122  -82  -52  -I%  -32  -72  -10%  -62  -10%
6uinea  uissau  42  102  132  02  -72  -132  -122  -72  -11%
Niger  0%  -52  22  -42  -127.  -162  -192  -192  -131
Tanvania  12  32  -112  -8%  -52  -62  -62  -202
Honduras  -92  -52  -52  -12  3X  52  62  5%
Ghana  -2%  -32  -52  -32  31  39n  -12  -I1
Burma  02  0%  -1%  -22  -22  02
Burkina  FasD  5S  6%  6%  32  32  1%  -1%  32
Chad  6%  10%  142  102  11%  52  4%  3%
Somalia  -32  -42  -32  -32  O  -32  02  102
Oil  Exporters
Egypt  11X  -3X  -5l  1X  12  322  .15
Caneroon  3X  71  6%  7%  6%  8X  62  52  10%
Ecuador  1%  -4%  -52  -32  -22  -42  -t4  -42  7X
Mexico  02  -12  -4%  -47.  -61  -22  -22  0%  7%
Nigeria  -7%  -'2  -7?  -!22  -72  -62  -31  -72  12
Algeria  -1%  -9X  -162  -192  -17%  -152  -142  -13%  -32
Venezuela  -9%  -161  -1T17  -182  -102  -9%  -152  -132  -7%
Indonesia  -5%  -122  -182  -182  -15  -16%  -152  -142  -1'750
TAILE  9A
Gains  of Debtors  sith Counterfattual  Torn  of TraCe
(Sas,  export  and  import  prices  relative  to the  manufacturing
unit value  as  in 1969.731  Situlated  since  1978S
1982  1984  1986
Teros  of Trade
CF  Networth  gain  (in  current dollars)
Africa  ($27,0791  1140,135)  (146,454)
Asia  (146,493)  t174,1911)  1101,5121
India  $20,551  o34,082  149,919
EHENA  *6,109  $116,65  S17,374
LAC  (134,3111  14z,19)1  (127,0O4)
Ln*  Income  *12,621  124,660  134,510
middle  Income  IS114,4011  ($165,7301  (1172,1571
Non  oil Exporting  *101,453  $177,254  8270,067
Oil Exporters  ($215,65I4  ($342,94)  (1$442,224)
Hnufactuerrs  895,257  t171,819  $261,513
Primary  S1),S16  $30,096  143,064
ilCs  (167,770)  (897,772)  ($94,7361
Hics  Oil  Comtries  1$126,477)  (1194,2071  (1237,423)
Hics  Non  Oil  Countrie  158,706  S96,435  $142,637
Sk  Countries  (121,662)  (11461l)  122,3SS
Non  SAL  Cotmtries  ($90,118)  ($126,409)  ($160,046)
CF  Networth  gain  GDP%hare  (as  percent  of SOP)
Africa  -15.5?  -24.52  -35.3l
Asia  -15n.7  -24.21  -33.12
India  11.1I  17.62  21.32
ENENA  2.12  6.12  11.12
LAC  -4.8U  -6.02  -4.11
Lov  Incou  10.52  21.22  27.11
Middle  Incone  -6.4  -13.02  -13.2t
Non  Oil  Exporting  12.11  23.02  30.6?
Oil Exporters  -41.9?  -63.3?  -105.22
Nanufacturers  14.72  30.4:  38.12
Priarvy  6.0  9.3?  13.32
HICS  -7.62  -12.3?  -11.9?
Hics  Oil Countries  -37.12  -60.2S  -100.86
Hics  Non  Oil Couwtries  10.62  20.42  25.5?
SAL  Countries  -1.32  -1.3?  2.0?
Non  SAL  Countries  -20.72  -46.2n  -53.42
CF  Nletorth  gain  DetShare  (as  percent  of total debt)
Africa  -44.21  -56.42  -50.i2
Asia  -37.02  -50.9?  -57.42
India  80.22  109.0S  120.13
EnIIIDI  4.71  12.3?  21.0?
LAC  -10.62  -12.02  -6.9?
Lo Intome  21.51  33.2?  41.1?
Kiddl Intoe  -19.7?  -25.4?  -22.9n
Non  oil  Exporting  27.0?  42.11  55.02
11  Exporters  -104.52  -147.n  -168.9?
Manufacturwrs  36.7n  59.S  76.32
Priwy  10.I2  15.22  18.3?
NiCs  -17.5t  -22.7?  -20.02
Nice  Oil Countries  -91.12  -122.0?  -141.22
Hics  Non  oil Coustrsn  23.7n  3S.5  4.n
SAL  Contries  -4.32  -2.6  3.4?
No SAL  Cmntries  -60.02  -U4.3?  -93.02
Note:  Asia  eicldes India  and  China51
TABLE  99
Increase  of  Net  Worth  (Reduction  of  Debt)  From  Accumulated  Value  of  Resource  Balance
6ains  Fran  The  Teras  of  Trade  Effects
1982  1966  1982  1986
Share  of  Debt  Share  of  GDP
Terms  of  Trade  Terms  of  Trade
CF  Networth  gain  CF  Networth  gain
MFG.  Exporters  MF6.  Exporters
Uruguay  889.9  158.6.  Uruguay  25.4%  94.6%
Turkey  74.7%  135.2%  Turkey  27.72  76.3X
Hungary  84.67  124.72  Hungary  32.9%  90.8%
Thailand  65.81  124.4%  Thailand  21.8%  55.2X
India  80.2%  120.8%  India  11.12  21.8%
Pakistan  40.6%  117.6%  Pakistan  14.96  48,3%
Brazil  36.9%  e0.9%  Brazil  12t.6  33.6Z
Korea  29.5%  70.0%  Korea  15.4Z  32.8%
Portugal  26.5X  56.9%  Portugal  15.4I  '3.0%
Philippines  24.3X  44.0%  Philippines  14.92  40.9%
Morocco  24.8%  31.8.  Morocco  18.92  39.42
Yugoslavia  10.6%  18.9%  Yugoslav 4a  3.2%  6.3%
Jordan  7.9%  -31.0%  Jordan  5.1%  -28.21
Tunisia  -39.0%  -57.9%  Tunisia  -19.2%  -40.2%
Primary  Exporters  Pritary  Exporters
Chad  270.  1Z  349.9%  Chad  72.5%  30.2%
Zambia  139.5%  195.1X  Zambia  131.3% 591.9%
Chile  85.1%  183.12  Chile  S).7X  227.9%
Guatemala  145.  3Z  178.9%  Guatemala  25.6%  65.92
-l  Salvador  58.8X  174.7%  E:  Salvador  24.0Z  74.91
Papua  New  6uinea  64.3%  39.  4%  Papua  NJew  Suinea  44.3%  127.4%
Burundi  13.  OX0.03  Burundi  23.?7  98.2%
Zaire  2.7%  ?28X  Zaire  27.5  1539.52
Kenya  66.4%  126.2%  Kenya  '  '2  86.0O
Ma'awi  59  :14.5%  Sa  awi  46.3%  104.2%
Benin  51.7%  94.3%  8enin  ;2.BX  60.3%
Panama  45.3%  89.5%  Panama  41.51%  6.6%
8..rkina  Faso  100.8&  94X7%  Burkina  Faso  ;4.6%  41.62
Madagascar  73.8%  60.4%  Madagascar  48.6%  87.5%
Guyana  35.42  6Z.7Z  3uyana  7.1%X  144.9%
Sierra  Leone  3  1Z  6  4.3  Sierra  Leone  1.2%  30.9%
Paraguay  37.3%  59.5%  Paraguay  B.?%  33.7X
6hana  -32.3%  54.3%  Ghana  -10.7%  22.8%
Jamaica  19.4%  44.92  lamaica  18.8%  73.8%
Dominican  Repubi  17.5%  29.8X  Dominican  Republ  6.3Z  18.89
Central  Afr.  Rep  21.2%  22.6%  Central  Afr.  Rep  6.9%  10.7%
Haiti  -4.0%  22.2%  4a;  i  -1.5%  7.  2
Bangladesh  20.0%  19.0G  Bangladesh  7.7%  ?.7%
Peru  -5.9%  9.8%  Peru  -2.8X  6a  O
Rwanda  82.8%  9.6%  Rwanda  12.7%  2.32
Mauritania  8.9%  4.1%  Mauritania  13.6%  8.5%52
TABLE  99  Icon't.i
1962  1986  1982  1986
Ivory  Coast  -2.1%  3.0%  Ivory  Coast  -2.3%  3.5%
Somalia  -15.4%  -0.31  Soaalia  -8.4%
Costa Rica  4.4%  -1.7%  Costa  Rica  5.8Z  -1.7%
Ethiopia  12.1%  -2.8%  Ethiopia  3.4X  -1.21
Honduras  -30.9%  -5.8%  Honduras  -19.9%  -4.8%
Surma  -16.8%  -12.9%  Burma  -5.8%  -5.9%
Guinea  Bissau  14.2%  -14.6%  6uinea  Bissau  13.6%  -26.71
Mali  8.6%  -14.8%  Mali  6.1%  -16.6%
Togo  -10.8%  -14.9%  Togo  -12.1%  -15.8%
Colombia  -19.0  -19.9%  Colombia  -5.0%  -9.3%
Argentina  -2.1%  -31.q%  Argentina  -1.6%  -19.9%
Senegal  -32.6%  -40.5%  Senegal  -20.7%  -32.5%
Sudan  -26.7X  -47.1%  Sudan  -22.2%  -52.9%
Guinea  -39.6X  -67.6%  juinea  -29.8%  -61.9%
Tanzania  -43.8%  -80.0%  Tanzania  -20.5'h  -70.1%
Malaysia  -62.1  -SI.1%  Malaysia  -30.9%  -65.4%
Sri Lanka  -46.8%  -305.'2  Sri Lanka  -28.2%  -66.6%
Niger  -34.8%  -118.1%  Niger  -17.0h  -82.86
Oil Exporters  Oil Exporters
Cameroon  91.5Z  1622.4%  Cameroon  29.2%  57.3%
Egypt  4.47  4197.  Egypt  3.4%  33.5%
Ecuador  -26.9%  -47.0%  Ecuador  -17.0%  -38.1%
Nexico  -37.9X  -48.3%  Mexico  -19.5%  -39.1%
VeneZuela  -.66.4%  -318.1%  Venezuela  -78.3%  -215.72
Nigeria  -299.2X  -339.3%  Nigeria  -41.1'  -159.9%
indonesia  -240.3%  -35s.5%  Indone2Sia  -67.2% -201.2%
Algeria  -173.2Z  -394.9%  Algeria  -63.9%  -112.9%53
TABLE  10-A
Increase  of Netuorth  lReduction  of Debt)  uith Resource  Dalince  Sein  Fron
CF  Taros  Of  Trade  and  Mith  A  Four  Percent  Real  Internst:
1982  1984  1986
CF  Netvorth  gain  Coelbngo
Africa  $19e,379)  ($22,045)  ($34,518)
Asia  ($32,239)  ($36,024)  f$b7,476)
India  C$1,332  $28,115  845,613
EMENA  $5,134  $23,825  S45,0  5
LAC  $31,906  bS,5025  689,930
Lox  Incone  $8,586  i18,048  $26,336
liddle  Income  ($42,163)  $12,733  $6,634
Non  oil  Exporting  1117,509  $216,797  $317,699
Oil Exporters  (159,672)  (1204,064)  (311,065)
Manufacturers  $100,557  $186,742  $284,243
Priary  $25,539  $48,103  $59,792
HICs  ($7,381)  $40,989  S48,015
Hcts  Oil Countrin  (181,001)  ($90,591)  (8134,754)
Hics  Non  Oil Countries  $73,620  $131,578  *182,769
CF  NItnotth  gain  Coebined  (Share  of SDP)
Africa  -10.52  -13!  -27m
Asia  -10.9!  -11.71  -22.01
India  9.91  14.61  19.9!
IENEA  1.7X  89.6  13.31
LAC  1.7!  10.12  13.72
Los  Incom  7.11  15.5!  20.71
Riddle Iccoo  -3.1  1.02  0.5!
Non  oil  Exporting  14.0N  28.12  36.0!
Oil Expurtirs  -30.9S  -40.6  -74.0N
Manufacturers  j5.5!  33.1!  41.41
Priory  8.21  14.91  18.41
HICs  -0.8!  5.1!  6.0!
Hics  Oil Countries  -23.7!  -28.1!  -57.21
;;cs Non  Oil Countrin  13.12  27.81  32.7!
SAL  Countries  2.3!  9.3!  12.9!
Mon  SAL  Countries  -22.01  -26.89  -3! p
CF  Netmorth  gain Coabined  (Share  of Debt)
Mrica  -302  -31!  -39!
Alia  -25.6!  -24.7!  -38.1!
India  71.5!  8.9!  110.4!
ENEMA  4.0!  17.4!  25.3!
LAC  3.71  17.8!  23.0!
Lou  lncom  14.6!  28.0!  31.4!
Riddle Iacom  -7.22  1.9!  0.9!
Non  oil  Exporting  31.3!  51.52  64.7n
Oil Exportsrs  -77.3!  -87.9?  -111.81
NanufacturrS  38.71  64.3!  33.5?
Pri w  14.6!  24.3!  25.5?
HICs  -1.9!  9.5!  10.3!
Hics  Oil Countries  -58.41  -56.9!  -80.21
Hics  Non  Oil Countries  29.7!  4.4!  5  9.3
SAL  Countries  5.57  118.3  21.9?
io  SAL  Contries  -46.0!  -48.3!  -65.42
Notet  Asia  Escludes  India  and  China54
TABLE  10
increase  of Net  llorth (Reduction  of Debt)  Nith  resource  balance  gains
from  CF  terms  of trade and  vith a four percent  real interest: share of GOP
1979  1980  1981  1992  1993  1984  1985  1986
*CF  Nettorth gain Combined  GDPshare
1ambia  8.41  25.32  52.31  91.1  137.32  195.4l  237.62  456.01
Chile  7.02  14.22  23.89  S1.9S  85.71  116.89  174.72  217.62
Guyana  6.11  10.22  29.4l  54.12  75.7!  109.5!  126.72  132.52
Papua  HIe  Guinea  -3.71  -1.2!  16.0!  40.1!  60.3!  79.1!  106.5!  126.6!
Zaire  -2.9!  -3.0!  3.3!  13.72  31.3!  66.2!  91.4!  113.9!
nalaIi  11.9!  22.1!  31.12  38.9!  45.1!  53.6!  73.9S  98.2t
Panama  2.3!  12.3!  27.6!  45.9!  62.98  74.1!  82.2!  95.98
Jamaica  0.6!  2.7!  14.3!  26.7!  39.3!  67.3X  93.7!  89.2X
Uruguay  3.7!  7.82  12.31  21.1!  50.5!  67.02  85.17  98.2!
Hauritius  5.2!  14.9!  29.6!  47.6%  59.5!  76.5!  99.7!  82.6!
Kenya  1.0!  7.5!  19.3!  33.0!  48.2!  57.7!  71.9!  81.4l
El Salvador  0.9!  4.9!  16.1!  27.il  39.22  47.9!  67.2!  80.3X
Hungary  5.3!  12.5!  18.61  25.1!  36.0!  47.0!  59.1!  76.8!
Hadagascar  9.7!  19.6!  31.9!  39.9!  45.51  59.1!  67.57  72.7X
Turkey  0.4!  4.6!  12.2!  23.8!  36.6!  49.8!  60.3!  71.6!
Guatmeala  2.7!  6.72  15.4!  22.5!  27.2!  30.82  36.6?.  58.5!
Chad  8.7!  22.4!  37.0!  51.5!  55.6!  68.4!  57.6!  56.0!
Benin  4.32  6.6!  16.9!  26.4!  39.5!  51.0!  59.1!  55.1!
Thailand  1.6!  4.6!  11.7!  20.3!  26.1!  32.9!  46.0!  54.7!
Cauroon  6.1!  10.8!  17.6!  25.3!  34.0!  39.4!  46.89  !.S
Burundi  2.1!  6.1!  15.0!  25.3!  31.3  40.9!  46.2!  52.12
Pakistan  -1.12  -0.3!  6.3!  14.1!  23.5!  29.1!  36.5!  47.37.
forocco  -0.2!  2.6!  10.8!  19.12  29.21  40.9Z  47.9!  42.0!
Portugal  -1.1!  1.4!  9.6!  18.9%  30.4!  44.1!  51.5!  41.4!
Philippines  -1.82  -0.3!  5.2!  11.8!  20.5!  28.9!  35.0!  S9.6!
Brazil  -0.3!  2.2!  8.0!  14.89  27.6!  34.1!  39.32  39.4!
korea  -1.3!  2.61  10.9!  18.89  25.4!  30.7!  37.62
Paraguay  7.9!  6.61  7.0!  10.5!  11.5!  17.5!  33.1!  :8.!
Sierra  Leone  -V.8!  -9.4!  -7.0!  -0.12  5.3!  14.62  17.7:  I^.O
Ivory Coast  -6.0!  -6.1!  0.3!  13.6!  27.4!  36.6!  41.2!  28.4.
Egypt  -4.3!  -9.0!  -6.6!  -3.89  1.4%  6.7!  14.3!  :7.9!
Burkina Faso  7.11  13.42  18.0!  23.52  27.9!  30.89  32.4!  7.1!
Costa Rica  -3.4!  -4.1!  3.9!  11.5!  34.6!  37.1!  40.7!  22.5%
Ghana  -4.3Z  -10.4!  -14.3!  -12.2!  27.2!  24.2!  23.4!  21.!%
Indi4  0.9!  4.3!  7.3!  9.9!  11.2!  14.6!  16.2!  19.9%
Dominican  Republic  3.82  1.7!  1.4!  5.02  9.3!  18.0%  25.4!  :9.92
Yugoslavia  -0.4!  -0.4!  2.9!  6.4!  11.5!  16.7!  19.9S  :4.::
Honduras  -5.6!  -10.7!  -9.1!  -2.8!  4.0!  10.5!  15.7!  .72
Haiti  0.3!  -2.5!  -1.62  2.1!  4.7!  7.6!  10.3!  1.3:
Central Afr. Rep  -0.32  1.12  3.1!  5.0!  9.0!  8.4!  10.6!  9.:
Bangladesh  1.0!  -0.12  2.3!  7.41  12.1!  11.7!  7.9:  9.4!
Colombia  -2.7!  -3.9!  -1.5!  1.3X  3.1!  4.32  5.5%  4.47
Peru  -6.5l  -9.0!  -5.6!  -1.9!  0.1!  1.52  4.3!  2.!
Mauritania  -0.9!  4.5!  8.4L  8.62  13.9!  17.3!  12.5!2  .72
Argentina  -2.4!  2.4!  6.3!  9.42  8.7!  6.3!b  6.9!55
TALE  103  (ten't.l
1979  1980  1991  1982  1983  1994  1995  1986
banda  -2.51  1.1?  6.2  9.7?  6.98  3.4?  3.5?  -2.21
Ethiopia  0.71  1.6t  2.11  2.2?  2.21  4.91  4.7Z  -2.89
Ekudor  -5. b2  -10.  82  -9. 52  -6.  Bl  -6  .82  -3 .22  -3. 32  -3.9n
Moaica  -2.31  -5.  7  -6.42  -9.6?  -7.8?  -.  92  -1.31  -4.0O
Burma  -0.62  -2.22  -4.6?  -5.82  -5.89  -5.5?  -5.12  -5.97.
fali  2.11  4.92  5.02  3.21  -2.4?  -11.92  -22.6?  -24.1%
Jordan  -10.0?  -7.1?  4.1?  9.3?  9.9?  7.32  4.31  -25.1?
Senegal  -2.3?  -4.62  -11.5?  -16.02  -21.1%  -27.02  -29.4?  -29.7%
Togo  -14.4?  -19.6?  -23.1%  -26.9?  -29.0%  -30.3?  -31.98  -33.  2?
Tutisia  -3.9?  -7.6?  -12.6?  -19.2?  -23.9?  -28.22  -30.7%  -37.82
Sri  Lanka  -9.0?  -12.4?  -11.9?  -12.2?  -16.6?  -22.61  -29.3?  -45.1?
Malaysia  -9.71  -19.9?  -23.7?  -23.6?  -233.9  -26.52  -34.2?  -50.4?
suinea  Iissau  9.07  22.6?  15.6?  7.62  -5.3?  -19.4?  -26.62  -55.4%
Sudan  -4.01  -10.9?  -14.6?  -27.01  -36.7?  -47.3?  -56.12  -74.4X
Niger  -6.32  -4.42  -6.3?  -15.62  -31.3?  -57.8%  -74.5?  -79.8?
6uinma  -6.12  -12.02  -22.4?  -30.1?  -34.41  -42.32  -53.61  -51.61
Tauzania  1.5?  -10.7?  -28.1?  -24.31  -30.2?  -40.4?  -43.4?  -9W.6%
Algeria  -10.9?  -27.21  -44.9?  -59.32  -69.1%  -78.32  -86.2%  -100.6!
Nigeria  -1.82  -9.6?  -20.9?  -27.7?  -35.0?  -40.9?  -49.6?  -119.8%
Venezuela  -18.32  -38.62  -51.3?  -56.11  -60.9?  -93.42  -108.89  -146.0%
Indonesia  -13.3?  -29.0?  -42.4?  -55.62  -81.1?  -92,12  -109.1%  -170.41
Soelia  -4.41  -7.82  -9.1%  -7.8?  -10.9?  -7.2?  -0.7256
TABLE  IOC
Intreae of  Nht  lorth (Reduction  of Debt)  vith resource  balance  gains
froe  CF  tares  of trade asd  with a four  percent  real interest:  ratio to debt
1979  1980  1981  1982  1993  1994  1995  1996
CF  Networth  gain coebined  kbtshare
Chad  27.62  81.6!  124.82  192.01  211.92  249.5  250.62  U44.02
El Salvador  3.62  19.1!  49.21  66.5!  86.1!  115.0!  147.3!  187.2!
Chile  15.51  32.2!  49.52  72.9!  93.12  112.4!  136.6!  174.9!
Iauritius  17.2!  36.9!  60.5!  98.6!  115.1!  145.7!  156.12  170.2!
6uatteala  18.12  45.0!  105.0!  127.3!  136.9!  124.6!  137.7!  159.89
Camroon  16.1!  30.1!  53.5%  70.7!  96.22  119.2!  130.9!  151.5:
Zaaiba  9.3!  30.3!  58.41  96.92  121.4!  141.0!  139.3%  150.3!
Uruguay  20.4!  47.N!  63.8!  73.69  82.11  107.4!  113.1!  147.9!
Papua  New  Guinea  -13.72  -4.41  33.89  58.2!  76.7!  93.1!  108.5!  138.5!
Turkey  1..!  13.6!  36.7!  64.0!  92.5!  114.7!  122.6%  126.9%
Thailand  6.5!  1&.98  39.01  61.3!  75.6!  91.6!  100.71  123.3!
Kenya  2.3!  15.4!  39.3!  59.8!  73.89  91.0!  96.0!  119.5!
Burundi  13.6!  35.42  83.0!  113.5!  110.1!  117.7!  111.5!  116.7!
Pakistan  -2.5!  -0.89  16.9!  38.3!  57.5!  77.3!  90.0!  115.0%
India  6.92  39.1!  61.92  71.5!  78.31  89.9!  94.82  110.4%
flalawi  18.3!  33.9!  47.2!  52.62  62.1!  73.2!  85.52  C7.9%
Hungary  356.52  26.9!  42.21  64.5!  78.62  94.89  93.5t  105.42
Zaire  -6.02  -6.32  6.1%  26.2!  45.92  65.3!  75.1!  104.8%
Panau  2.4t  14.7!  31.82  50.1!  62.6!  77.5!  94.4  :00.3t
Brazil  -1.2!  7.32  26.5%  43.5!  57.6!  68.4!  93.32  94.82
Jenin  10.5!  18.3!  37.0!  41.82  54.32  74.89  76.0!  96.6!
Korea  -3.72  5.4!  22.5!  36.0X  48.9X  61.41  68.4!  83.37.
Portugal  -2.92  3.9!  19.82  32.5X  43.41  57.2!  63.8t  71.5!
Paraguay  33.6!  31.5!  35.3%  45.02  46.4!  53.7!  59.0!  68.21%
Hadagascar  34.4!  51.3!  57.5!  60.5!  62.3!  66.3!  63.22  56.82
Sierra Leone  -23.51  -24.62  -17.89  -0.2!  15.1!  36.5!  46.2%  62.4?
6uyana  5.1!  7.9!  20.1!  28.5!  38.82  50.7!  55.4U  s.:2
Burkina  Faso  27.7!  51.3!  61.02  68.4!  66.11  64.7!  59.0%  .3l
Janaica  0.8!  3.98  17.0!  27.6!  38.52  46.1!  48.89  t4.,
Bhana  -13.92  -36.5!  -42.6!  -37.0!  73.6!  60.4!  49.l7%
Philippines  -3.9!  -0.62  9.61  19.42  29.5!  39.5!  43.72  42.61
Egypt  -6.1!  -11.7!  -8.82  -4.92  1.92  9.5!  18.6!  34.9t
Morocco  -0.4!  5.4!  16.0!  25.1!  30.9!  38.0!  35.6%  23.92
Haiti  1.32  -12.1!  -5.72  5.8!  13.5!  21.2!  28.3!  31.6!
Dooinican  Republic  12.2!  5.4!  4.1!  14.0!  20.4!  29.3!  34.2l  31.6!
Ivory Coast  -11.42  -10.89  0.4!  12.9!  24.0!  29.4!  29.2!  2S.9%
Costa  Rica  -6.52  -7.2!  3.2%  9.7!  25.7!  34.0!  34.91  2!.42
Central  Afr. Rep  -1.89  4.71  9.6!  15.5!  20.89  20.7!  22.2!  :9.0%
Honduras  -10.32  -19.1!  -14.32  -4.3!  5.7!  14.5!  19.32  16.7!
Bangladesh  3.89  -0.3!  7.2!  19.4!  26.72  29.2!  19.32  16.52
Colombia  -13.0!  -18.6!  -6.4!  4.89  10.6!  13.6!  13.3!  9.5%
Peru  -11.0!  -19.6!  -13.71  -4.0!  0.1%  2.3!  5.3!  .72
lauritania  -0.89  3.9!  6.42  5.7!  8.5!  9.7!  6.1!  )  2
Somalia  -9.0!  -14.9!  -17.02  -14.3!  -17.1!  -16.2!  -1.2!  -2.7!
Prgentina  -5.9!  5.1!  10.22  12.3!  12.6!  10.6!  9.32  -;.3257
TlALE  IO  (can't.)
1979  1980  1991  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
Ecuador  -11.62  -21.21  -17.02  -10.91  -9.61  -3.91  -4.72  -4.9l
lexica  -7.2l  -18.62  -19.62  -18.72  -12.02  -6.92  -2.32  -5.02
Ethiopia  3.6  9.32  8.0l  7.82  7.62  14.9l  11.9l  -6.6l
Rwanda  -16.52  6.92  41.62  63.42  52.82  19.1l  16.61  -9.32
Burm  -2.62  -8.71  -15.52  -16.91  -15.22  -14.62  -11.32  -12.92
Mali  5.7n  11.12  9.32  4.52  -2.62  -9.92  -16.22  -21.6l
Jordan  -18.61  -13.42  7.02  14.42  12.22  9.62  4.62  -27.62
6uinea Bissau  15.82  18.32  17.72  8.02  -4.62  -11.32  -14.52  -30.22
Togo  -12.62  -20.42  -23.52  -24.12  -23.12  -25.89  -24.42  -31.32
Senegal  -5.92  -10.72  -20.32  -25.22  -27.42  -31.42  -30.92  -37.02
Tunisia  -8.32  -18.12  -28.22  -36.92  -45.31  -50.82  -49.32  -54.62
Malaysia  -42.12  -74.52  -64.62  -47.42  -39.82  -47.92  -51.22  -62.5%
Sudan  -9.51  -15.72  -20.02  -32.52  -39.92  -45.62  -50.71  -6b.3l
Sri  Lanka  -17.32  -25.92  -21.52  -20.32  -28.31  -44.52  -49.32  -71.3%
Guinea  -8.92  -19.52  -29.72  -40.02  -49.92  -67.52  -75.89  -19.02
Tanzania  3.72  -21.62  -40.32  -52.02  -57.42  -69.32  -74.82  -1:.61
Niger  -21.12  -12.92  -13.32  -31.89  -60.82  -94.12  -91.92  -113.72
Venezuela  -37.12  -77.72  -106.42  -119.12  -110.42  -127.62  -155.52  -7 5.  3t
Nigeria  -23.22  -99.62  -165.98  -201.72  -167.12  -200.98  -227.22  .252.Il1
Indonesia  -39.52  -108.32  -172.72  -198.92  -218.02  -244.62  -257.92  -296.98.
Algeria  -20.22  -61.62  -113.12  -160.98  -226.52  -293.92  -318.12  -352.  2:1T(:I
1 P.F  1
Changes of  Investment  and  Resource Bal.
1979-82  to  1983-86  (Shore  of  GOP)
0.05  -
0.04  -
0.03  - Guinea  issou  _ bropica
0.02  - i  Cameroon
ffi  0.01  E  ll  Ethiopia
0  0-  *pa~~~~~E[!rkey
-0.01  - 1ol  Pakistan  0  m0  E  Koreo
o  ~~~~~0  0  Uoim
*  -0.02  - *hoilon
2  -0.03  U  n  Unisia  °  Thailand
-0.04  *  AJgeri  aii  KenD  y  i 
-0.05  - °  13OE  MExhil,*
-0.06  0
-0.07  o  0  U  U  Magascor  V
- -0.08  UruguGyU*  l  Malowi  0
%  -0.09  IEI  Argentina
2,)  -0.112U  Nigeria  3  0 O -0.12  I0 
-0.13  El  Philippines  0  Ivory  4ost
-0.14  1  Jorda
-0.15  a
-0.1  6-  _______________  _  *  1I4  ger
I  I  IIIr
-0.06  -0.02  0.02  0.06  0.1  0.14  0.18
Change  of  Resource  Balance  Share  of  GDP
Correlation  Coefficient: -.63
*  - ~~at  52' ~59
FIGlURE  2a
NET  TRANSFERS  1978-1982  ($B)
OUNrAY  ra:Ess  vs.  PIMMt  OEw9s
17
is  VNAYFClso  R 
la
14




17  CTrAL  NET




vQ.LuNTARV  AccE  PpOsMz  OsTom
NET  TRANSFERS  198,3-1986 ($8)









ZZVOLUNTRY ~aC  P  PROBLEM  OSMtWS60
FIGURE 2b
NET  TRANSFERS  SHARE  OF GNP (1978-1982)
VOUNr  ACCES  VS. PM~ma.  S
::a  A




0.016  TAL  PEr PR%91E  T







=  V.LINTM  AC£SS  PROlEM OETOUR!
NET  TRANSFERS  SHARE  OF  ONP (198,3-1985)
o.a)15  V~'OLLi4AMY  AOES  VS.  PFVMMJ DraWs
0-
-0.005







vauLNrARf?  ACcEES  wiotruZ  CriwFFIGURE  3
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PRIVATE NET  TRANSFERS AND  ACTUAL  DEBT
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Change In Investment &  TOT  Shock to  '86
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APPEND1I  ;
Classification  of  70  RALI  Countries
O0  Sub-Saharan  20  Latin America  10  Asia  21  0 EMENA  17  Highly  Indebted  I1  Ley-Income  39 Mi:dle-Incone
Africa  I Caribbean  Ccuntries  C.untries  IJ  Countr.es
Benin  Argentina  Bangladesh  Algeria  Argentina  Bangladesh  Algeria
Burkina  Faso  Bolivia  Buret  ugypt  Bolivia  Benin  Argentina
Burundi  Brazil  Indonesia  Hungary  Brazil  Burkina  Faso  Bolivia
Caseroon  Chile  Korea  Jordan  Chile  Bursa  Brazil
Central  Afr  Rep  Colombia  Malaysia  Morocco  Colcmbia  Burundi  Caseroon
Chad  Costa  Rica  Nepal  Pakistan  Costa  Rica  Central  Afr  Rep Chile
Cote  DOIvoire  Dominican  Rep Papua  New  6uinea  Portugal  Cate  O Ivoire  Chad  Colombia
Ethiopia  Ecuador  Philippines  Tunisia  Ecuador  Ethiopia  Costa  Rica
Ghana  El  Salvador  Sri  Lanka  Turkey  Jamaica  Ghana  Cote  DOIvoire
Guinea  6uateeala  Thailand  Yugoslavia  Mexico  Guinea  Oceinican  Rep
Guinea-Bissau  Guyana  Morocco  Guinea-Bissau  Ecuador
Kenya  Haiti  Nigeria  Haiti  Egypt
Madagascar  Honduras  Peru  Kenya  El  Salvador
Malnai  Jaeaica  Philippines  Madagascar  Guatemala
Mali  Mexico  Uruguay  Halaui  Guyana
Mauritania  Panama  Venezuela  Kali  Honduras
Nauritius  Paraguay  Yugoslavia  Mauritania  Hungary
Niger  Peru  Nepal  Indonesia
Nigeria  Uruguay  Niger  Jamaica
Rwanda  Venezuela  Pakistan  Jordan
Senegal  Rvanda  Korea
Sierra  Leone  Senegal  Malaysia
Somalia  Sierra  Leone  Mauritius
Sudan  Somalia  Mexico
Tanzania  Sri Lanka  Morocco
Togo  Sudan  Nigeria
Uganda  Tanzania  Panama
Zaire  Togo  Papua  New  Suv^ea
Zambia  Uganda  Pariguay











I/  GNP  Per  Capita  at 19B5  is below  $450.
Data  for  Bolivia,  Nepal,  Uganda,  Zimbabwe:  incomplete  or  not  available.
21  Asia  Excludes  India and  China76
APPENDIX  I  (Cont'j)
8 Oil  Exporting  49 Nonoil, Nonmanufacturing  24 Countrias  with  16 Prcblem  eobtors  49  Adjustment  Landing  22 Non  SAL
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